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REMOVAL OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS OF
FEDERAL OFFICIALS: RETURNING TO THE
ORIGINAL INTENT OF CONGRESS
Kenneth S. Rosenblatt*
I.

INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM

Our federal courts are overwhelmed with cases that do not involve federal questions. Although diversity jurisdiction is the main
culprit,' there is another potential source of such cases.' Under 28
U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1),' federal officials may remove criminal prosecutions for acts committed "under color of office" to federal court.
This statute poses. some interesting and serious problems. Con©
*

1989 by Kenneth S. Rosenblatt
B.A., 1979, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D., 1982, Stanford Law School.

Mr. Rosenblatt is a Deputy District Attorney for Santa Clara County and was counsel for the
State of California in California v. Mesa, 813 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S.
Ct. 1993 (1988), affid, 57 U.S.L.W. 4199 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1989) (No. 87-1206). The author is
grateful to Professors Eric Wright and Willie Fletcher for their insightful review of earlier
drafts of this article.
1. Time to Kill Diversity Jurisdiction?,NAT'L L.J. 1 (Feb. 29, 1988).
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1982).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1982) reads as follows:
(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court against
any of the following persons may be removed by them to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is
pending:
(1) Any officer of the United States or any agency thereof, or person acting
under him, for any act under color of such office or on account of any right, title
or authority claimed under any Act of Congress for the apprehension or punishment of criminals or the collection of the revenue;
(2) A property holder whose title is derived from any such officer, where
such action or prosecution affects the validity of any law of the United States;
(3) Any officer of the courts of the United States, for any act under color of
office or in the performance of his duties;
(4) Any officer of either House of Congress, for any act in the discharge of
his official duty under an order of such House.
The procedure for removal is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1446. Upon receiving the petition,
the district court must determine whether it presents a prima facie case for removal. If it
survives this test, the court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether removal is
appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (c)(4), (5) (Supp. 1 1977). If the district court grants the petition, the case is tried in federal court using state substantive law and federal procedure. Where
a federal defense is asserted; the trier of fact applies federal law to determine the scope of the
defense and whether the facts support that defense.
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sider the case of an FBI agent investigating a police chief for corruption. While driving to a meeting with a confidential informant placed
within the police department, the agent is pulled over for a traffic
violation. He is arrested when' narcotics are allegedly found in his
car. In light of section 1442(a)(1), what is the proper forum for the
ensuing prosecution of the agent for speeding and possession of
narcotics?
The problem is that section 1442(a)(1) does not define which
cases require the supervision or protection of a federal court. Certainly, the statute should be construed to mandate federal court review of federal questions. Otherwise, state courts could frustrate federal law by explicitly or implicitly declaring federal law invalid.
Thus, federal officials presenting defenses based upon federal statutes should be allowed removal.
But many routine criminal cases against federal employees present no federal questions. Consider the case of a postal worker who
violates traffic laws while delivering the mail.4 If "under color of
office" encompasses all acts committed while on duty, then section
1442(a)(1) creates a special criminal court for federal officials. Although such an interpretation may provide federal employees with a
measure of protection against local harassment, that reading also undercuts state sovereignty and burdens the district courts.
In sum, the problem is how to reconcile a legitimate need to
remove certain cases to federal court with a state's right to enforce its
criminal laws.
A.

There Is Great Potentialfor Abuse of the Federal Courts

Federal officials should be allowed to remove cases to federal
court in order to resolve federal questions. Federal courts should also
be available where there is serious concern that the state prosecution
was motivated by animus toward federal officials. Unfortunately,
federal officials are removing other cases as well in order to gain a
tactical advantage over local prosecutors.'
4. California v. Mesa, 813 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1993
(1988), aff d, 57 U.S.L.W. 4199 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1989) (No. 87-1206). Two cases were consolidated for purposes of appeal in Mesa. The named defendant was charged with vehicular
manslaughter after the mail truck she was driving allegedly struck and killed a bicyclist. In the
second and unrelated case, Shabbir Ebrahim (aka Azam) was charged with speeding and failing to yield after the mail truck he was driving struck a police car.
5. See Mesa, 813 F.2d at 961 n.l. For example, the Assistant United States Attorney in
charge of the United States Attorney's Office that petitioned to remove the two traffic cases in
Mesa stated that federal prosecutors routinely filed such petitions. "It was not an unusual
practice; we did it as a matter of course. It's like playing on your home field." Supreme Court
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The first tactical advantage is geographic. Removal to federal
court may require local prosecutors to travel hundreds of miles to the
nearest federal courthouse to prosecute minor offenses.6 Prosecutors
may be reluctant to expend the time and energy required to pursue a
misdemeanor or infraction in federal court. Fewer witnesses will be
willing or able to travel long distances.
Familiarity with the terrain and the players is also a major incentive for removal. Many federal employees are represented by the
United States Attorney General's office,7 whose attorneys are more
comfortable in federal court. Most local prosecutors have never appeared in federal court. 8 Furthermore, defendants have nothing to
Battle Pits State Against Feds, San Francisco Recorder, Dec. 2, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
The United States Department of Justice is allowed to represent federal employees at the
employee's request under 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a) (1982). According to the Department, United
States Postal Service employees alone remove about sixty cases each year. Petition For Rehearing With Suggestion For Rehearing En Banc at n.3., Mesa, 57 U.S.L.W. 4199 (U.S. Feb. 21,
1989) (No. 87-1206). Although that number is small, there are no statistics available on how
many cases are removed by federal employees represented by private counsel or proceeding pro
se. Moreover, the low number may understate the problem. Removal without a federal defense
was not available until the Third Circuit decided Pennsylvania v. Newcomer, 618 F.2d 246
(3d Cir. 1980). There is little public awareness of that decision. A Supreme Court decision or
congressional amendment allowing removal of all traffic offenses involving federal officials
while on duty could create a litigation explosion. Pro se litigants with distinctive and uninformed views about our Constitution and legal system could be expected to make a federal case
out of a traffic ticket. The lure of "fighting that traffic ticket to the Supreme Court" might
prove irresistible. See Virginia v. Harvey, 571 F. Supp. 464, 465 (E.D. Va. 1983).
Since traffic cases can be resolved relatively quickly in district court, removal under an
expansive reading of section 1442(a)(1) might constitute more of an annoyance than a problem. However, Mesa was a vehicular manslaughter prosecution. Capital cases could also be
removed, thus imposing a greater burden on district courts. See id.
6. In California, the county seat of Del Norte County is Crescent City. Crescent City is
in the Northern District of California. The nearest federal court regularly used within that
district is located over 350 miles away in San Francisco. Many other Northern California
counties are located over 100 miles away from their respective federal district courts.
7. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a) (1982). An interesting definitional problem arises when a
criminal case is removed to federal court. Federal procedural statutes grant certain rights to
"the Government." But is a state prosecuting a case in federal court "the Government," particularly when the United States Attorney General represents the defendant? Although the answer seems obvious, the Ninth Circuit fastened upon such a distinction in holding that Arizona
could not appeal from a district court's grant of a judgment of acquittal because the language
of the statute granting appellate jurisdiction referred only to the United States when allowing
appeal by the prosecution. See Arizona v. Manypenny, 608 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd,
451 U.S. 232 (1981). Although the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, it did not
resolve the issue of whether federal statutes referring to "the United States" or "the Government" apply to state prosecutors. See Manypenny, 451 U.S. at 244 n.18, 250-51 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
8. This factor can hardly be underestimated. Federal and state criminal procedure can
be radically different, as in California. No attorney wishes to represent a client in a forum in
which he has never practiced and with which he is completely unfamiliar. Local prosecutors
are unfamiliar with either federal criminal procedure or local federal sentencing practices.
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lose: they enjoy federal procedural protections in federal court while
retaining all substantive protections available under their applicable
state constitutions.'
But, removal in inappropriate cases imposes costs upon both
federal and state governments. Federal courts are burdened with
cases presenting no issues of federal law, including such minor matters as traffic citations.1" This creates a substantial amount of work
for federal judges, who are forced to integrate state substantive law
with conflicting federal criminal procedure. Those conflicts raise issues of first impression and create errors requiring reversal or
retrial.1 1
State governments suffer even greater harm. State sovereignty is
invaded to satisfy nebulous, or even non-existent, federal interests.
Furthermore, many cases end in a negotiated plea-bargain. All protestations aside, a
United States Attorney has an advantage in presenting his case to a judge before whom he
appears daily.
9. Manypenny, 451 U.S. at 241. Federal protections may be greater than those provided
by the states. For example, defendants charged with vehicular manslaughter in California are
not entitled to a preliminary hearing under California law. However, federal procedure provides for such a hearing because the maximum penalty under California law is one year in
jail. See Rules of Procedure For the Trial of Misdemeanors Before United States Magistrates,
Rule 2(b)(7) (mandating a preliminary hearing for non-petty offenses unless defendant consents to trial before the magistrate). More important, defendants in cases removed to federal
court are still entitled to all their protections under state law. See Aurora v. Erwin, 706 F.2d
295 (10th Cir. 1983).
10. See Puerto Rico v. Santos-Marrero, 624 F. Supp. 308, 311 (D.P.R. 1985).
11. See Aurora, 706 F.2d at 299-300 (holding that federal procedure impermissibly denied a defendant the right to a jury trial guaranteed under Colorado law). Although federal
procedural rules are applicable to removed cases, Aurora held that such rules are superseded
by any state procedural rule that is "substantive." The Tenth Circuit defined substantive rules
as rules incorporating rights guaranteed by the state constitution. Id. Aurora thus requires
each district court to study and interpret the applicable state constitution (itself a novel experience) and determine which procedural rules (e.g., trial by jury) are in fact substantive. The
judge must then integrate those rules with federal procedural rules. A single mistake may well
mandate reversal. Id. at 298-99. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the distinction between
constitutional and statutory provisions suggested by the Tenth Circuit in Aurora correctly
defines the standard. Many states have enacted their exclusionary rules as statutes, and earlier
courts have given primacy to state rules on evidence, voir dire, and sentencing. See Virginia v.
Felts, 133 F. 85 (C.C. Va. 1904).
Even if federal law is superseded only by that state law which is based upon a state
constitution, any state retaining independent and adequate state grounds based upon its constitution may present conflicts with federal criminal procedure. State supreme courts have handed
down at least 450 decisions based upon state constitutions which conflict with federal law, and
the majority of those decisions involve criminal cases. Collins, Galie & Kincaid, State High
Courts, State Constitutions, and Individual Rights Litigation Since 1980: A JudicialSurvey,
13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 613 (1985-86) [hereinafter Collins]; Wermiel, State Supreme
Courts Are Feeling Their Oats, Wall Street J., June 15, 1988, at 1, col. I (updating Collins);
Collins & Galie, Methodology, NAT'L L.J. 58 (Sept. 29, 1988) (listing some of those cases
sorted by category).
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prosecutors unfamiliar with federal court may lose worthy
Even if the state secures a conviction, the defendant is senby a federal judge unfamiliar with local sentencing practices.
removal invades the state's ability to enforce the peace, "the

centermost pillar of sovereignty."2

B. The Supreme Court Resolves a Split Between the Circuits Over
the Meaning of Section 1442(aX1), But Does Not Reach a Crucial
Issue
In Pennsylvania v. Newcomer, 3 the Third Circuit interpreted
section 1442(a)(1) broadly by holding that federal officials could remove criminal prosecutions arising out of acts committed while on
duty without alleging a defense based upon federal law.' This interpretation allowed federal employees to remove routine traffic citations sustained while on duty. The circuit based its holding upon
Willingham v. Morgan,'5 where the Supreme Court allowed removal of civil cases if the employee alleged that he acted while on
duty.
But in California v. Mesa," the Ninth Circuit declined to follow Newcomer. Mesa held that a defense based upon a federal law, a
"federal defense,"' 7 was required for removal by postal workers
charged with routine traffic offenses. 8 The Ninth Circuit relied
upon a 1926 case, Maryland v. Soper (No. 1),9 where the Supreme
Court appeared to require a federal defense.
The Supreme Court recently affirmed the Ninth Circuit opinion in sweeping terms, but left a crucial issue unresolved.2" The
12. California v. Mesa,.813 F.2d 960, 966 n.12 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S.
Ct. 1993 (1988), affd, 57 U.S.L.W. 4199 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1989) (No. 87-1206). See Kelly v.
Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 47-49 (1986); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971).
13. 618 F.2d 246 (1980).
14. Id. at 250.
15. 395 U.S. 402 (1969).
16. 813 F.2d 960 (1987).
17. As discussed in later sections, the term "federal defense" is defined here as any
defense relying upon federal law. This includes cases where the official claims that all his acts
forming the basis of his prosecution were protected by federal law. Thus, an act of self-defense
required to prevent interference with federal law or occasioned by enforcement of such law
gives rise to a "federal defense" because the official claims that all his acts were necessary and
proper under the federal law defining his duties. See Maryland v. Soper (No. 2), 270 U.S. 36,
46 (1926); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 27, 261 (1879).
18. Mesa, 813 F.2d at 967.
19. 270 U.S. 9 (1926). This case is designated as Soper (No. 1). The companion case,
Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 36 (1926), is referred to as Soper (No. 2).
20. Mesa, 57 U.S.L.W. 4199 (U.S. Feb 21, 1989) (No. 87-1206).
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Court held that federal officials must aver a federal defense as a condition of removal. 2 However, the Court left open the possibility that
an official lacking a federal defense, such as the FBI agent charged
with speeding and narcotics possession, could obtain removal by
claiming that the prosecution was motivated by animus toward federal officials.

-

The Court's decision not to resolve that issue is understandable,
as the federal defense requirement is incompatible with removal of
claims of malicious prosecution. A claim of malicious prosecution, or
"harassment," does not by itself raise a federal defense because the
official does not necessarily claim that his acts were protected by federal law.2 3 Accordingly, claims of harassment do not necessarily allege that the official's conduct was within the purview of section
1442(a)(1). Thus, insistence upon a "federal defense" requirement
for removal appears to allow states to harass federal officials.
In contrast to the Supreme Court's opinion in Mesa, both the
Third and Ninth Circuit decisions addressed the harassment issue,
albeit unsatisfactorily. The Third Circuit dispensed with the federal
defense requirement on the theory that Congress intended section
1442(a)(1) to allow removal whenever the official allegedly committed the act charged while on duty.2 4 Providing for removal of any
case where the official was on duty would allow removal of most
malicious prosecutions. Unfortunately, the Third Circuit's standard
would also create a special federal court for federal employees.
Moreover, local law enforcement inclined toward malicious prosecution could simply harass the official after he left work (e.g., by prosecutions for vagrancy, building code violations, or possession of narcotics at home).
The Ninth Qircuit opinion in Mesa was also flawed. 25 Although the Ninth Circuit required a federal defense, a close reading
of that opinion would allow a district court to waive the requirement
whenever it appeared that the importance of the federal interest asserted justified the invasion of state sovereignty. 2 Such an approach
21. Id.
22. Id. at 4204-05 (Brennan, J., concurring); see infra text accompanying notes 146-60.
23. For example, a state could charge an official for reckless driving where the official
had not even been driving a car. The official's defense to the charge under such circumstances
could not be based upon federal law. And, as discussed later, this problem is difficult because
the official's simple denial of the charges does not present a federal defense allowing removal.
See infra text accompanying notes 76-162.
24. Pennsylvania v. Newcomer, 618 F.2d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 1980).
25. Mesa, 813 F.2d at 967.
26. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 133-45.
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would interfere with state sovereignty and produce unpredictable
results.
Thus, given these lower court opinions and the Supreme
Court's failure to address it, the "harassment" issue still awaits
resolution.
C.

Resolving the Problem

The harassment problem exists because the courts have ignored
the original intent of Congress. The federal official removal statute
was only inteflded to ensure that federal courts could prevent misinterpretation or defiance of federal law by state courts. Congress
never intended to grant removal to officials claiming harassment, but
instead contemplated that those officials would seek a writ of habeas
corpus. Accordingly this article contends that removal should be reserved for federal defenses and that habeas corpus should be used to
resolve harassment claims.
In reaching this conclusion, this article first reviews the history
of section 1442(a)(1) and the evidence demonstrating that Congress
always intended to require a federal defense for removal. This article
notes the legislative history which suggests that Congress did not
contemplate harassment as a grounds for removal. The article then
turns to the cases interpreting section 1442(a)(1) in its various enactments, and suggests that the Third Circuit's incorrect decision was
an outgrowth of confusing Supreme Court decisions.
The article next examines whether the federal defense requirement is mandated by the Constitution. Although the Supreme Court
in Mesa 7 correctly reaffirmed the federal defense requirement based
upon its own precedent, the Court was also presented with the argument that article III jurisdiction depends upon the presence of a federal defense. The Court noted that the lack of a federal defense in
Mesa posed a "grave constitutional problem," but elected to avoid
resolving the issue.28 That decision may prove unfortunate. The federal government may seek additional protection for federal officials
by asking Congress to eliminate or relax the federal defense requirement. The article suggests that such legislation would impermissibly
expand federal court jurisdiction beyond the boundaries of article
III.
Finally, this article suggests that Congress intended the writ of
habeas corpus as the appropriate remedy for harassment of federal
27.
28.

57 U.S.L.W. 4199 (U.S. Feb 21, 1989) (No. 87-1206).
Id. at 4204.
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officials. Recent appellate court decisions and procedural differences
between the two remedies also suggest that the writ is the best vehicle for resolving harassment claims.
II.

THE HISTORY OF SECTION 1442(A)

The history of the federal official removal statute indicates that
Congress used the remedy sparingly, as befits a threat to state sovereignty. From the outset, Congress crafted the removal statute as a
limited remedy to protect certain federal laws from state misinterpretation or defiance. Congress periodically reenacted removal statutes
protecting different classes of federal officials only when the laws
which those officials enforced were the subject of state hostility. Protecting federal officials who enforced federal law was the only mechanism available to protect the law itself. Congress provided for removal to protect enforcement of federal law, not to allow federal
officials to remove all torts or crimes committed while on duty. The
history of the statute suggests that Congress never changed its focus
from protecting federal law to extending jurisdiction to all cases involving federal employees.
A.

The Judiciary Act of 1789

Removal is grounded in the constitutional provision of federal
jurisdiction. Article III, section 2 vests the judicial power in the Supreme Court and lower courts established by Congress over all cases
arising under the Constitution and the laws of the United States. It
follows that a mechanism must be available for transferring such
cases from state to federal courts. But the Constitution does not define that mechanism.
Congress created inferior courts by enacting the Judiciary Act
of 1789.29 That Act also provided for removal of certain civil cases to
federal courts where Congress believed that local prejudice would
preclude a fair hearing."0 Congress did not include a separate provision for removal of suits against federal officials. The Act provided
29. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 79, 85 (1789) [hereinafter Judiciary Act].
30. Id. The Act implemented the federal diversity jurisdiction provided under article III,
section 2. Article III provides diversity jurisdiction apart from the grant of jurisdiction over all
cases arising under the laws or Constitution of the United States. This separate constitutional
provision for civil diversity jurisdiction was necessary because such civil suits would not present issues of federal law. Note that the Framers did not include an additional exception for
suits involving federal officials, even though they provided special grants of jurisdiction in article III for cases involving other groups (i.e., ambassadors and aliens). U.S. CONST. art. III, §

1989]

REMOVAL OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS

for removal after trial only where federal law had been declared invalid by a state."'
However, even that modest intrusion into state jurisdiction was
challenged as unconstitutional shortly after Congress enacted the first
federal official removal statute in 1815. 82 That this issue was not so
well-settled as to discourage the Virginia Supreme Court's attack
suggests that Congress would have been inclined to draft the most
restrictive removal statute possible.
B.

The First Federal Official Removal Statute

The legislative history of the first federal official removal statute
demonstrates that it was only a modest and temporary extension of
the Judiciary Act. During the War of 1812, the federal government
found its embargo on trade with England ignored by New England
states. The Act of 1815 ("An Act to prohibit intercourse with the
enemy")83 was proposed to aid and protect federal customs agents in
enforcing the embargo."'
The only available piece of legislative history consists of a letter
to Congress from the Secretary of the Treasury providing Treasury's
views on the purpose of the statute.3 5 The Secretary noted that the
Customs Office was headed by a handful of "collectors." Subordinate
to those collectors were the more numerous customs inspectors, who
were charged with inspecting ships and seizing contraband concealed
on ship or shore.
Inspectors were immune from suit where they proved that they
enjoyed the authority to search and that a particular search was sup31. A final judgment, or decree, in any suit, in the highest court of law or equity
of a State, in which a decision of the suit could be had, where is drawn in
question the validity of an authority, exercised under the United States, and
the decision is against the validity, may be re-examined, and reversed, or affirmed, in the supreme court of the United States, upon a writ of error; but the
matter in dispute must exceed the value of two thousand dollars, exclusive of
costs.
Judiciary Act, supra note 29, at 85 (emphasis added).
32. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304 (1816), the Virginia Supreme
Court held that the appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court as defined in the
Judiciary Act did not encompass review of state court decisions. The United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding that such jurisdiction was created by article III and that removal jurisdiction was coextensive with that provision. It should be noted that the challenge was not
raised by the Virginia Supreme Court until after Congress had enacted the federal official
removal statute. Id.
33. Act of February 4, 1815, ch. 31, 3 Stat. 195, 198 (1815) [hereinafter 1815 Act].
34. 28 ANNALS OF CONG. 758-61 (1814) [hereinafter ANNALS].
35. ANNALS, supra note 34, at 757-61 (also appearing in the American State Papers,
1802-15, Finance, at 881).
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ported by probable cause. The Secretary explained that courts had
always ruled that inspectors, in addition to collectors, possessed such
authority as part of their inherent powers. However, the State of
Vermont attempted to defeat the embargo by refusing to acknowledge the authority of the inspectors. The Secretary related that several Vermont courts had ruled that inspectors were not authorized to
search for contraband, but were only allowed to conduct routine inspections. When an inspector suspected that a ship was carrying contraband, those courts required that one of a handful of collectors specifically appoint an inspector to execute a search. Inspectors who
searched without such appointment were held civilly liable. These
rulings made it impossible for the small number of collectors to delegate their duties and severely hampered the Treasury's attempts to
curtail smuggling in the New England states."
The Secretary wanted to extend the Judiciary Act of 1789 to
ensure enforcement of the federal customs laws in the face of these
decisions misconstruing federal law. But under the Judiciary Act,
civil cases could only be removed to federal courts after the judgment
was rendered against the inspector in the highest court in the state.3"
This delay meant that states c~uld forestall federal review until after
the war ended and could obstruct customs officials without interference. The Secretary wanted to amend the Act to allow removal of
civil cases before adjudication by any state court. 88
36. ANNALS, supra note 34, at 758-59.
37. Judiciary Act, supra note 29.
38. The Secretary first noted that the Judiciary Act only allowed removal of decisions to
the Supreme Court after judgment, quoting the Act's provision allowing removal "where is
drawn in question the validity of an authority . . . and the decision is against the validity."
ANNALS, supra note 34, at 760. The Secretary only intended to adjust the Judiciary Act for
the duration of the war to allow immediate transfer to federal court of state challenges to
federal law authorizing searches and seizures by customs inspectors; he did not intend to expand federal jurisdiction dramatically.
"A more effectual provision should be made for transferring, from the State courts to the
Federal courts, suits brought against persons exercising an authority under the United States,
so that such suits may be transferred, as soon as conveniently may be, after they are commenced." ANNALS, supra note 34, at 761 (emphasis added).
The Secretary's letter did not refer to criminal prosecutions. Apparently, Vermont chose
to obstruct federal authority by making customs officials liable for damage suits. "That, limited
as the general powers of the revenue officers appear to be, they are rendered still more inadequate by the terror which the officers now feel, of being exposed to suits for damages ....
ANNALS, supra note 34, at 758. The Secretary used the terms "suit" and "prosecution" interchangeably to denote civil suits. Thus, when describing the protection afforded inspectors by
federal law, he spoke of suits and prosecutions for damages
[iln the performance of their duties, the inspectors, in common with the other
officers of the customs, are protected by the law, when unjustly sued or molested, in actions for damages; and when any prosecution is commenced, on
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Congress acted upoh that request by passing the 1815 Act,
which allowed for removal of any suit or prosecution
against any collector, naval officer, surveyor, inspector, or any
other officer, civil or military, or any other person aiding or assisting, agreeable to the provisions of this act, or under colour

thereof, for any thing done, or omitted to be done, as an officer
of the customs, or for any thing done by virtue of this act or
89
under colour thereof.
The resulting language was quite broad and seemed to belie the
Secretary's modest request. The phrase "for any thing done . . . as

an officer of the customs, or for any thing done by virtue of this act
or under colour thereof" could be read as allowing removal for all
acts committed while on duty as a customs official."0 Furthermore,
such a statute might be read as precluding state authorities from
harassing customs officials by other judicial means.
However, reading the removal provision as a whole suggests a
more restrictive intent. Only those acts "agreeable to the provisions
of this act or under colour thereof" were covered. Thus, only those
acts which might be defended by recourse to the remainder of the
Act (enumerating the powers of customs agents) could be the basis
for removal. 4 ' This interpretation is consistent with the Secretary's
request. Although the 1815 Act only protected against misinterpretaaccount of the seizure of any ship, or goods, in which judgment is given for the
claimant, the inspectors are released from all responsibility, on showing that
there was a reasonable cause of the seizure.
ANNALS, supra note 34, at 759 (emphasis added).
39. 1815 Act, supra note 33, § 8 (emphasis added). Although the Secretary apparently
did not consider the problem of criminal prosecutions, the text of the Act indicates that Congress intended "prosecutions" to mean criminal prosecutions. 1815 Act, supra note 33, § 8
(requiring that petitioner post with the state court such bail as was originally required in that
court; that section also prevented the state from appealing an acquittal of defendant in state
court).
40. However, acts committed while off-duty would not be protected in any case because
of the requirement that the act have been committed as an officer of customs. 1815 Act, supra
note 33, § 8.
41. 1815 Act, supra note 33, §§ 1-2, 4-6. The structure of the Act supports such a
reading. It is difficult to conclude that Congress specifically enumerated certain customs officers
as falling under the statute, set forth their powers, specifically allowed those officers to remove
for acts "done by virtue of this act or by colour thereof," and then also allowed them to remove
without comment all cases arising out of miscellaneous minor torts and crimes unrelated to
their duties.
Finally, this author is unaware of any reported cases arising under the 1815 Act, which
expired in 1821. See infra note 43. Surely such a broad construction would have provoked
widespread comment and litigation. The only published discussion of the statute occurs in a
Supreme Court brief filed in Osborn v. Bank of the United States 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738
(1824). That brief implies that a federal defense was required. See infra note 174.
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tion or defiance of federal law, that was 'the only threat posed by
Vermont. There is no indication in the Secretary's letter that Vermont was arresting federal officials on trumped up charges; the danger came from adverse civil rulings.42 Moreover, any person enforcing the Act was covered, even if that person was not a federal
official. Thus, Congress did not intend to protect all acts of federal
officials without regard to a federal defense. The focus of the 1815
Act was on the authorized activity, not on the actor's status.
C.

The Re-enactment of the 1815 Act to Protect Federal Tariffs

The 1815 Act was a temporary measure which expired after the
War of 1812"' to lie dormant until the next crisis. South Carolina's
passage of the Nullification Act in 1832 rekindled the need for removal to protect federal law. The Nullification Act declared federal
tariff laws unconstitutional and authorized criminal prosecution of
federal revenue agents attempting to collect such tariffs. As part of
the federal response, President Jackson requested the "revival" of
the 1815 Act with minor modifications. Jackson's proposed law originally allowed removal, not only for acts under color of the revenue
laws, but for acts under color of any United States law." However,
42. See supra note 38. Congress was taking a very large step just by including criminal
prosecutions. The Judiciary Act of 1789 did not provide for such removal, although article III,
section 2 made no distinction between civil and criminal cases. As of 1815, whether such cases
could be removed was still an open question; the issue was not completely resolved until the
Supreme Court held in 1821 that the federal judicial power extended to state criminal prosecutions. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). This also suggests that Congress
did not enact a statute designed to "expand" along with federal jurisdiction. There was no
reason for Congress to believe that federal jurisdiction would expand, not just to criminal cases
in state courts, but to include cases raising no federal question. In addition, there was no
reason to believe that states would begin harassing federal officials by bringing criminal
charges against them unrelated to their enforcement of federal law.
Had Congress wished to provide the fullest extent of protection consistent with future
expansion of article III jurisdiction, one would expect to find a debate on the breadth of the
Act in the official reports. But the only legislative history appears to be the Secretary's letter.
43. The Act expired by its terms at the end of the War, but its removal provisions were
re-enacted in 1817 and remained in force for another four years. See Act of March 3, 1817, ch.
109, 3 Stat. 396 (1817); The Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 254 (1867).
44. It may therefore, be desirable to revive, with some modifications better
adapted to the occasion, the 6th section of the act of the 3d of March, 1815 ...
to provide that, in any case where suit shall be brought against any individual
in the courts of the State, for any act done under the laws of the United States,
he should be authorized to remove the said cause . . ..
22 ANNALS OF CONG. 145, 153 (1817) (emphasis added) (President Jackson's message to
Congress).
President Jackson did not suggest that all federal officials be protected, or that all acts
committed while on duty be immunized from state court review. Rather, he was intent upon
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at some point in the legislative process the proposal was narrowed to
encompass only revenue laws.
The Senate debate demonstrates that Congress did not intend to
expand federal jurisdiction radically. Senators linked the statute with
the necessity that federal courts adjudicate federal questions in order
to circumvent state hostility to federal law. As discussed by Senator
Daniel Webster, the Act was adopted to "give a chance to the officer
to defend himself where the authority of the law was recognised."4
The debates over this statute demonstrate the relationship between protection of federal law and prevention of harassment of federal officials. Congress was motivated by the need to protect federal
law and federal authority. Those who exercised that authority had to
be protected against state courts refusing to recognize federal law.
Removal to courts that would uphold defenses based upon federal
law was the answer. Although protection against generalized harassment was a concern, the focus at the time was on state laws that
punished the enforcement of federal law. There was no suggestion
that the state was initiating prosecutions against federal officials for
acts other than the attempted enforcement of the federal tariff."
protecting only those individuals (not necessarily federal officials) prosecuted for enforcing federal law.
45. 22 ANNALS, supra note 44, at 461 (remarks of Senator Daniel Webster) (emphasis
added). Senator Dallas also contemplated the statute as frustrating any attempts by a state to
preclude an official from "appealing to the constitution and laws under which he acted." 22
ANNALS, supra note 44, a 419. The issue prompting his comment was whether to postpone
removal until after the state's highest court had interpreted the federal tariff law in each case,
as contemplated by the Judiciary Act of 1789, so as to avoid a conflict of jurisdiction injurious
to South Carolina's dignity. Senator Forsyth noted that postponement would create conflicting
rulings by state and federal courts, and that federal officials would bear the brunt of enduring
such decisions until federal court review.
Senator Wilkins noted that the burden was particularly heavy because the Nullification
Act made the request for an appeal a crime punishable by fine or imprisonment. Senator
Webster's comment suggested that since the federal official's defense rested on the validity of
the tariff and invalidity of the Nullification Act, jurors sworn to follow that Act would not give
the official a fair trial because they would refuse to honor the federal defense. Thus, removal
was necessary to uphold federal law.
Senator Webster believed that the removal provisions should remain in place after the end
of the crisis to protect against future collisions between state and federal judicial systems. 22
ANNALS, supra note 44, at 419. He did not suggest that such provisions were intended to
protect all federal officials while on duty; he was only interested in protecting federal law from
state court adjudication. 22 ANNALS, supra note 44, at 419.
46. Even the habeas corpus provision enacted as part of the Act was confined to acts
"done, or omitted to be done, in pursuance of a law of the United States, or any order, process,
or decree, of any judge or court ...." Act of March 2, 1833, ch. 57, 4 Stat. 632, 634 (1833)
[hereinafter 1833 Act]. A malicious prosecution of a federal official for littering would not have
been on account of an act "in pursuance of a law of the United States," although it would have
violated the Supremacy Clause. Yet, Congress did not add constitutional violations to the lan-
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The Act of March 2, 1833,"' tracked the language of the 1815
Act, but unambiguously stated that removal depended upon a federal
law defense. It provided:
in any case where suit or prosecution shall be commenced...
against any officer of the United States, or other person, for or
on account of any act done under the revenue laws of the
United States, or under colour thereof, or for or on account of

any right, authority, or title, set up or claimed by such officer,
or other person under any such law of the United States
48

Thus, the identity of the actor or his status as an on or off-duty
official was not important; the issue was whether his defense relied
upon federal law."9
D.

Removal During the Civil War

The next removal statute was enacted during the greatest conflict between federal and state governments: the Civil War. As part
of the 1863 Act suspending the writ of habeas corpus, Congress provided for removal of suits and prosecutions
against any officer, civil or military, or against any other person,
for any arrest or imprisonment made, or other trespasses or
wrongs done or committed, or any act omitted to be done, at any
time during the present rebellion, by virtue or under color of
any authority derived from or exercised by or under the President of the United States, or any Act of Congress."0
This statute by its terms required a federal defense based upon
guage of the writ statute until 1867. See infra note 211. Congress surely would have included
such a provision in 1833 had there been a problem with prosecutions unrelated to the officials'
enforcement of federal law.
47. 1833 Act, supra note 46, at 632.
48. 1833 Act, supra note 46, at 633 (emphasis added). The use of the language "under
colour of" was probably intended to cover situations where the officer's defense did not depend
directly upon a particular revenue law, but alleged that the act (e.g., assault) was made necessary by resistance to his authority, such that his act was in protection, or "under colour of"
federal authority. See supra note 17.
49. Thus, even if the 1815 Act could be read broadly, there is no reason to believe that
Congress would have first greatly expanded jurisdiction, only to contract it at a time of crisis.
Moreover, at least one court made clear its assumption that the official must allege a federal
defense in his petition for removal. See Salem & L.R. Co. v. Boston & L.R. Co., 21 F. Cas.
229 (C.C. Mass. 1857).
50. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 80, 12 Stat. 755, 756 (1863) [hereinafter 1863 Act]. This
statute was later amended to prohibit state courts from evading the removal provisions. See Act
of May 11, 1866, ch. 80, 14 Stat. 46 (1866). Those amendments merely closed technical "loopholes" in the statute and do not bear on the issues discussed in this article.
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federal law or authority. There was no room for quibbling; even its
opponents assumed that removal required a federal issue per article
III, section 2."' The debates also reveal that congressional concern
over harassment was still directed toward improper adjudication of
federal defenses by state courts.52
The 1863 Act was the first federal official removal statute discussed by the Supreme Court. In The Mayor v. Cooper,5" the Court
sustained the constitutionality of the Act where federal officials had
obtained removal by alleging a federal defense. The Court held that
the statute was constitutional only because it required a federal defense. While the Court did not speak directly to the intent of Congress, it reiterated the constitutional limits to federal jurisdiction that
had guided Congress in enacting the removal statute.54
51. Although the constitutionality of the Act was hotly debated, all agreed that a federal
defense was a precondition to removal. The issue posed was whether to allow removal in
criminal, as well as civil, cases. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 535-37 (1862). Senators opposing removal for criminal cases suggested that such cases could be retained by the
state court while the federal question (i.e., federal defense) presented could be removed to
federal court for a ruling. Should the federal court rule against defendant, the state court
would proceed to try defendant for the charged offense against state criminal law. Id.
Those Senators opposing the Act argued that allowing removal of the entire criminal case
would require federal courts to act as state courts (to try state criminal charges), and that such
"usurpation" of state court functions would be an unconstitutional assertion of federal jurisdiction outside the ambit of article III, section 2. Id. Other Senators maintained that the 1815 Act
provided precedent for removing criminal cases. Although Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S.
(1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), was cited, no other cases from that period were referred to in the
debate. CONG. GLOBE, supra, at 535-37.
52. Although federal officials were harassed by frivolous lawsuits sustained by biased
judges, those suits were based upon acts performed by the officials in enforcement of federal
law during the Civil War. While the debate in Congress indicates concern that federal officials
would not receive fair trials in state courts, that concern was founded on the power of state
courts to negate federal defenses through their fact-finding powers. Federal appellate review of
state court decisions would be inadequate because many federal defenses depended upon findings of fact (e.g., whether a warrant was based upon probable cause). Even while purporting
to respect federal law, state courts could find that the evidence presented by the federal official
was insufficient to support that defense. Such fact-finding could effectively thwart federal authority. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 51, at 538-39 (colloquy between Senators Cowan and
Carlisle); Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights:
FederalRemoval and Habeas CorpusJurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L.
REv. 793, 808-10, 820-25 (1965). But Congress was concerned about hostility to the federal
defense, not undifferentiated hostility to all federal officials. There is no evidence that Congress
intended to allow removal of cases presenting no federal issue. However, Congress did expand
the writ of habeas corpus in 1867 to include any violation of the Constitution. See infra note
211. As discussed in a later section, this expansion suggests that Congress intended the writ to
counter harassment in the absence of a federal defense. See infra notes 207-14 and accompanying text.
53. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247 (1867). The Court construed the 1863 Act as amended by the
Act of May 11, 1866. See supra note 50.
54. Nor is it any objection that questions are involved which are not all of a
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The Court reaffirmed its position in McKee v. Rains.55 In McKee, a United States Marshal was sued for trespass after entering a
dwelling and seizing property pursuant to a writ of execution. The
official relied upon the 1863 Act to support removal. The Court remanded the case because "[nlo Act of Congress has been cited from
which authority can be derived to the Marshal of any court of the
United States to seize the goods of one person for the satisfaction of
the debts of another." 56 Thus, the Court made explicit the require57
ment that a federal official must base his defense on a federal law.
E.

The Internal Revenue Removal Statute of 1866

The next removal statute to be enacted was part of a general
internal revenue law. Congress enacted the revenue statute in 1864;
that statute was amended in 1866 and 1874.58 The removal provisions of the 1866 amendment are especially interesting because they
included for the first time the phrase "under color of office." 5 ' AlFederal character. If one of the latter exist, if there be a single such ingredient
in the mass, it is sufficient. That element is decisive upon the subject of jurisdiction. "A case in law or equity consists of the right of the one party as well as
the other, and may be truly said to arise under the Constitution or a law of the
United States whenever its correct decision depends upon the right construction
of either."
Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 252-53 (citations omitted).
The Court continued its analysis by stating that removal was necessary to protect federal
law, and indirectly federal officials, from adverse state tribunals. Id. See also The Justices v.
Murray, 76 (9 Wall.) 274, 279 (1869) (finding removal after jury trial to be prohibited by the
7th amendment), where the Court noted that each case under the 1863 Act involves "questions
arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties, or under some other
...
Id. at
Federal authority . . . .The case must be one involving some Federal question.
279 (emphasis added).
55. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 22 (1870).
56. Id. at 25.
57. Although the Marshal was clearly exercising federal authority by enforcing a court
order, the 1863 Act required that the official act under authority "derived from or exercised by
or under the President of the United States, or any Act of Congress." See supra text accompanying note 50. Court orders were held not to be covered by the Act. This problem prompted
Congress to add section 1442(a)(3) in 1916. See infra text accompanying notes 65-71.
58. The 1833 Act applied only to collection of duties on imports. The Internal Revenue
Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, 13 Stat. 233, 241 [hereinafter 1864 Act], provided that the 1833
Act was to "be taken and deemed as extending to and embracing all cases arising under the
laws for the collection of [revenue]." That provision was repealed and replaced in 1866 with a
different removal statute. See Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, 14 Stat. 98, 171 [hereinafter 1866
Act]; Gay v. Ruff, 292 U.S. 25, 32 n.8 (1934).
59. That in any case, civil or criminal, where suit or prosecution shall be commenced in any court of any State against any officer of the United States, appointed under or acting by authority of [the 1864 Act], or against any person
acting under or by authority of any such officer on account of any act done
under color of his office, or against any person holding property or estate by title
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though Congress did not specify the meaning of the phrase, the legislative history does not suggest that the new language signalled an
expansion of federal jurisdiction.6"
The Supreme Court's view of the meaning of the removal statute remained the same. In Tennessee v. Davis,6 1 the Court again
assumed that a federal defense was a prerequisite to removal.
It ought, therefore, to be considered as settled that the constitutional powers of Congress to authorize the removal of criminal
cases for alleged offenses against State laws from State courts to
the circuit courts of the United States, when there arises a Federal question in them, is as ample as its power to authorize the
removal of a civil case ...
When this is understood (and it is time it should be), it
will not appear strange that, even in cases of criminal prosecutions for alleged offenses against a State, in which arises a defence under United States law, the general government should
62
take cognizance of the case and try it in its own courts.

Again, the Supreme Court was not explicit about the federal
defense requirement because such a constitutionally based limit was
derived from any such officer, concerning such property or estate, and affecting
the validity of this act or acts of which it is amendatory . . . [the case may be
removed].
1866 Act, supra note 58, § 67.
60. Both the 1815 and 1833 Acts also allowed removal on account of any act done under
the laws, "or under colour thereof." The 1863 Act referred to acts "under color of authority."
The 1866 Act referred to officers appointed under the revenue laws. Their actions as officers in
reliance upon their authority under those laws were acts "under color of office." The change
from "under color of law" to "under color of office" appears to have been merely stylistic. The
Notes accompanying this section in the Statutes At Large state that it covers "all suits against
revenue officers, or persons acting under them and affecting the validity of this act ....
"
1866 Act, supra note 58, at 171 (emphasis added). Although the statute could be read as
allowing removal for any act committed by an officer appointed under the revenue laws, that
reading would render the next few words superfluous ("appointed under or acting by authority"). It appears that Congress simply omitted a comma after the clause "any person acting
under or by authority of such officer." There is no legislative history suggesting that Congress
intended to change the removal statute.
The 1866 Act was codified in 1874 and appears as section 643 of the Revised Statutes.
The only change made in 1874 was the insertion of the words "or of any such law" in the
phrase "on account of any act done under color of his office or of any such law." 1866 Act,
supra note 58, at 171. (emphasis added). Compare 1866 Act, supra note 58, at 171, with, §
643, Revised Statutes of 1874. It could be argued that the addition of the phrase indicates that
"under color of office" meant something different from "under color of the law." However,
there is no legislative history explaining the addition.
The section was recodified with no changes at JUD. CODE OF 1911, 36 Stat. 1097. None
of these statutes expanded federal jurisdiction. See Ruff, 292 U.S. 25 (1934).
61. 100 U.S. 257 (1879) (construing section 643 of the Revised Statutes of 1874).
62. Id. at 271-72 (emphasis added).
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obvious; the issue was whether the Constitution allowed removal of
federal defenses in criminal cases at all. Although the Court noted
the importance of protecting Federal officials from state hostility, it
based its decision upon the judicial power of the Federal government
to prevent state adjudication of federal law, specifically the federal
immunity defense.6"
F.

The Removal Statute Changes on Its Face

The first significant amendment"' to the removal statute occurred in 1916 with the addition of section 1442(a)(3), allowing a
court officer to remove civil and criminal actions "for or on account
of any act done under color of his office or in the performance of his
duties as such officer." 5 This is the most significant piece of legislative history supporting the federal defense requirement. The apparent distinction between acts "under color of office" and "in performance of duties" created by section (a)(3) indicates that merely being
on the job will not support removal for any official except court officers. Otherwise, section (a)(3) would be superfluous because court
officers could remove all such cases under section 1442(a)(1).
However, the phrase "in performance of duties" in section
1442(a)(3) also poses a problem because it suggests that Congress
was willing to exceed the traditional barriers of article III jurisdiction alluded to above in order to protect court officers even in the
absence of a federal question. But the legislative history of section
(a)(3) indicates that even court officers may remove only when they
base their defense upon the federal authority underlying the court
order.
The 1911 Revised Statute had confined removal to acts committed pursuant to the revenue laws. Court officers executing court orders in such cases could remove to federal court under section
63. Id. at 263, 266. The official in Davis relied upon a federal immunity defense by
alleging that his acts of self-defense were necessary and proper to his enforcement of federal
law. See Maryland v. Soper (No. 2), 270 U.S. 36, 42 (1926) (acts of self-defense are "part of
the exercise of official authority"). See also Amsterdam, supra note 52, at 874 n.328 (1965);
D. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT, THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS,
1789-1888 393-94 n.172 (1985).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(2) (1982), allowing removal to property holders whose title is
based upon "any law of the United States," was added as part of the 1866 Act, supra note 58.
Id. It is not relevant to our discussion because it so clearly requires a federal issue for removal.
Section 1442(a)(4) was added by the Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 130, § 8, 18 Stat. 371, 401,
and is discussed below.
65. Act of August 23, 1916, ch. 399, § 33, 39 Stat. 532 (emphasis added) [hereinafter
1916 Act].
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1442(a)(1) by raising a federal immunity defense based upon their
duty to enforce those laws. However, court officers executing court
orders where the underlying authority for the order was not a revenue law were held to be unprotected by section 1442(a)(1). The Supreme Court held in a series of cases that federal law did not protect
those court officers when sued in state court for a variety of torts
even though those suits were based upon the officer's execution of a
court order.66 The federal immunity defense, and thus removal, was
unavailable to those court officers.
Congress sought to provide court officers with the same protection afforded revenue officers and members of Congress.6 7 Since revenue officers were allowed to remove acts committed "under color of
office," that phrase was also included within section 1442(a)(3). But
additional protection was needed because of the Court's decisions
holding that federal law did not provide a defense to suits challenging the marshal's execution of court orders. Section 1442(a)(4),
added in 1875, allowed members of Congress to remove any suit on
account of "any act in the discharge of his official duty under an
order of such House."6' 8 Congress incorporated this protection of all
acts committed pursuant to federal authority into section 1442(a)(3)
by adding the phrase "in performance of duties." Thus, "in performance of duties" allows removal based upon the authority underlying the federal court order.
This conclusion was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Gay v.
Ruff.6 9 Defendant in Ruff was a receiver appointed by federal court
order to run a railroad. Plaintiff sued the receiver for the death of
his son allegedly caused by the negligent operation of a train by railroad employees. The receiver sought removal under section
1442(a)(3) based on his having been a federal court officer when the
incident occurred. The Court held that the receiver was a court officer for purposes of section 1442(a)(3). But the Court also noted
that the case was dissimilar to cases removable under section
1442(a)(3) because no federal questions were presented. The Court
held that Congress only intended "in performance of duties" to protect court officers relying upon the federal authority embodied in the
court order and denied removal. The Court's decision was inconsis66. See McKee v. Rains, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 22 (1870); Bigelow v. Forrest, 76 U.S. (9
Wall.) 339, 348 (1869); Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334, 342-44 (1865).
67. See Gay v. Ruff, 292 U.S. 25, 38-39 (1934) (quoting House Judiciary Committee
report).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(4) (1982) (emphasis added).
69. 292 U.S. 25 (1934).
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tent with the theory that "under color of office" included all acts
committed while on duty. Under that theory, the receiver in Ruff
should have been allowed removal because he was accused of negligence in performing his duties. But Ruff held that the receiver could
not have been acting "under color of office" under section 1442(a)(3)
because he had no federal defense.7
This narrow reading of section (a)(3) protected article III jurisdiction by limiting removal to cases implicating the Supremacy
Clause. It precluded state courts from hearing disputes involving the
obstruction or violation of federal court orders because state courts
could render the orders unenforceable by ignoring violations. But
other suits involving no federal issues would still be heard by state
courts because of article III.71
G.

The Modern Federal Official Removal Statute

Congress amended section 1442(a)(1) to include "[a]ny officer of
the United States or any agency thereor' as part of the Revision of
the Judicial Code in 1948. The statute still allowed removal for acts
"under color of such office." 2 The Reviser's Note to that section
stated that the amendment merely extended the right to remove to all
federal employees. 8 There is no evidence that the meaning of the
phrase "under color of such office" changed, or that recodification
abolished the federal defense requirement.7 4 Since it is unlikely that
70. Id. at 39 ("Nor is there reason to assume that he will in this case rest his defense on
his duty to cause the train to be operated.").
71. The Supreme Court's interpretation in Ruff may still allow removal of suits charging that the receiver negligently failed to perform the duties entrusted to him by the court. See
Ely Valley Mines v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 644 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1981). This result
is somewhat troubling. Since most orders appointing a receiver will simply require him to
manage a certain entity faithfully and well, negligence suits in practice will not raise issues
involving the interpretation of those orders. It appears that each case must be decided based on
whether a party raises such issues. Ely Mines involved such issues (alleged failure to account
per court order, refusal to obey Ninth Circuit order to return property, etc). Id. at 1312.
Courts should resist the temptation toconstrue that case broadly to allow removal of all suits
involving receivers.
72. The amendment inserted the word "such." See 23 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1982). If
the additional word changes the meaning of the phrase, itappears toemphasize the requirement that the officer demonstrate that his act rely on the power of that office for its legitimacy.
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1982) (Historical and Revision Notes).
74. In Wechsler, FederalJurisdictionand the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW
AND CONTEMP. PRoBs. 216 (1948), Professor Wechsler provided a contemporaneous view of
the 1948 Revision of section 1442(a)(1) demonstrating that Congress did not eliminate the
federal defense requirement. Wechsler criticized the draft Revision for not providing exclusive
federal jurisdiction over suits against federal officials "based on a claim of illegality in conduct
under color of their office." Id. at 220 (emphasis added). Wechsler was not referring to all
suits arising out of miscellaneous torts committed by officials while on duty, but to suits alleg-
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Congress would have greatly expanded federal jurisdiction in contravention of over a century of legislative history and Supreme Court
decisions in complete silence, it appears that the extension of protection to all federal employees did not change the character of the
protection. 5
ing constitutional violations under claim of federal authority. Id. at 220, 221 (discussing "parties in the official hierarchy who must be named defendants"). The Supreme Court had recently declined to decide whether such claims alleged a federal cause of action. Id. at 222. See
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
Professor Wechsler's comments on the draft as it related to such suits indicate that the
Revision retained the federal defense requirement. He characterized the removal statute as "a
proper extension of the removal now allowed to a small number of officials whose cases stand
upon no different ground than others." Wechsler, supra, at 221 (emphasis added). There is no
hint that the character of the protection was changed. He noted that the statute addressed the
official's needs by allowing him to "remove in any proper case." Wechsler, supra, at 221. If
officials may remove prosecutions on account of any act committed while on duty, then Wechsler's comment concerning removal "in any proper case" is inexplicable. The only explanation
is that Wechsler assumed that section 1442(a)(1) allowed removal based upon a federal defense, and that officials would be able to establish "the proper case" by asserting the official
immunity defense. Wechsler, supra, at 221.
Professor Wechsler made his assumption plain when attacking the "well-pleaded" complaint rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982). "When ... the plaintiff's reliance is on state law
and the defendant claims a federal defense, neither party may remove-except, of course, the
special case, to which attention has been called, of actions against federal officials." Wechsler,
supra, at 233. Federal officials, of course, must assert a federal defense to obtain removal.
Wechsler, supra, at 234 (proposing that only federal officials should be allowed removal based
upon a federal defense).
75. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 50 n.l (1986) (Congress speaks explicitly
when it radically re-adjusts the balance between state and federal authority). The Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that changes in language made during the 1948 Revision are presumed not to have changed the scope and meaning of the statute unless Congress clearly expressed such an intent in the Reviser's Notes. See Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Corp., 353
U.S. 222, 226 (1957). See also Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 467-74 (1975) (collected
authority); Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 318 (1985).
Furthermore, the Court's last decision interpreting section 1442(a)(1) prior to the passage
of the amendment supported a narrow construction of the statute. In Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945), the Court was called upon to construe the predecessor statute to 18
U.S.C. § 242 (1982), which criminalized the willful violation of an individual's civil rights.
The Court rejected petitioner's argument that an act "under color of law" for purposes of 18
U.S.C. § 242 (1982), included only those acts within the official's authority. The dissent suggested that section 1442(a)(1) only encompassed such acts, and that it should be construed in
pari materia with 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982). The majority responded that although section
1442(a)(1) had a particular and narrow meaning which would lead to the result desired by the
dissent, the differences in legacy and purpose between the two statutes precluded such a construction of 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982). Screws, 325 U.S. at 111-12, 145-46. See Note, Removal
of Suits Against Federal Officers: Does the Malfeasant Mailman Merit a FederalForum?, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1098, 1109-11 (1988).
Congress' inaction since 1948 is interesting in light of its amendment of the Federal Tort
Claims Act to provide for removal for federal officials in civil suits arising out of their performance of their duties. The Federal Drivers Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (1982), provides for
removal of civil suits against federal drivers upon certification by the Attorney General that the
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FROM CLARITY TO CONFUSION: THE APPARENT DEMISE
OF THE FEDERAL DEFENSE REQUIREMENT

The legislative history is clear: Congress and the Supreme
Court consistently required federal officials to allege a federal defense for removal. So how did we get to the point where two circuit
courts concluded that the federal defense requirement was extinct?
Two independent changes in the law combined to confuse the issue.
The first change occurred when the Supreme Court settled a longstanding disagreement over how to treat officials who deny having
committed charged acts. The second development was the expansion
of the federal official immunity defense.
A.

The Problem of the "Innocent Man"

To appreciate the problem of how to treat officials who deny
having committed the acts charged in the indictment (the "charged
acts"), consider a prohibition agent who discovers a homicide victim
while raiding an illegal still. The agent reports his discovery to the
local authorities and is promptly arrested for murder. The agent has
a choice. He has no knowledge of the homicide. If he admits killing
the decedent, he falsely incriminates himself. Moreover, since he has
no knowledge of the incident, he is not in a position to assert that the
killing was required by his duties. An alternative is to deny the killing and claim that he did nothing but his federal duty. But asserting
that he did nothing but his duty does not put a federal defense in
issue. After all, he is not accused of finding the decedent, but of killing him.
The official would like to plead in the alternative, by denying
the killing but alleging that all of his acts at the time of the incident
were protected by federal law. The problem with allowing removal
upon such an allegation is that the official can obtain removal without definitely stating a federal defense. The case may be removed
incident occurred while the official was performing his duties.
. Three points are worth noting. First, such certification does not provide a defense to the
action; it only allows removal. Second, Congress did not add this section until 1961, 13 years
after Congress amended section 1442(a), and the legislative history for the Federal Drivers Act
makes no mention of section 1442(a). The Act was enacted to provide a convenient vehicle for
trial of suits naming both the United States and the federal driver. See Katlein, Administrative
Claims and the Substitution of the United States as Defendants Under the FederalDrivers
Act: The Catch-22 of the Federal Tort Claims Act?, 29 EMORY L.J. 755, 761-64 (1980).
Third, and most important, Congress explicitly limited the Driver's Act to civil suits. Had
Congress wished to allow removal of all criminal and civil actions against federal officials for
acts in performance of their duties, it would have provided such relief when it enacted that
Act.
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only to have the official base his entire defense upon the prosecution's burden to prove that he committed the act. There is no guarantee that the federal official really needs the protection of federal
law and federal courts.
But prohibiting removal under such circumstances also poses
problems. Although many officials know about the act which provoked the prosecution, our official has no knowledge concerning the
incident prompting his prosecution. All he knows is that all of his
actions were in enforcement of federal law. To force him to elect
between a possibly meritorious defense and removal penalizes him
for a lack of knowledge about what happened. Consequently, our
federal official faces a serious dilemma.
The current split between the Third and Ninth Circuits is the
result of this problem and the Supreme Court's efforts to resolve it.
1. The Lower Courts Grapple with the Issue
The "innocent man" issue first arose in 1884 in Illinois v.
Fletcher,7 where federal marshals seeking to help a colleague avoid
arrest by state officials were charged with murder after a gunfight in
which one of those state officials was killed. The federal marshals
denied having fired their weapons. They also claimed that the incident arose because the state officials had interfered with the marshals' federal authority. The district court denied the petition for removal because the officials had failed to allege that the act for which
they were prosecuted (murder) was committed under color of office.
Since they had failed to admit the charged act, they had failed to
present a federal defense relevant to the prosecution. The court reasoned that the marshals had to meet the charges by justifying their
commission of the charged act under federal law." Although that
ruling may appear unfair, allowing removal based only upon a denial of the charges would have eliminated the federal defense
requirement.
Other federal courts refused to follow Fletcher, arguing that a
federal official should not be denied removal merely because he denied having committed the charged act. Those courts held that the
only issue should be whether the prosecution occurred as a result of
the official's enforcement of federal law.7 ' But those courts did not
76. 22 F. 776 (N.D. Il1. 1884).
77. Id.
78. See Oregon v. Wood, 268 F. 975 (D. Or. 1920); Alabama v. Peak, 252 F. 306 (S.D.
Ala. 1918).
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suggest a standard for ensuring that the official actually had been
prosecuted on account of acts protected by federal law or authority.
There remained the possibility that the official could gain removal by
merely denying the charges and asserting that he had committed only
acts protected by federal law. The Supreme Court's attempt to solve
the problem in Soper (No. 1)"' was the source of the split among the
Circuit courts.
2. The Supreme Court Addresses the Issue and Opens the
Doorfor Certain Harassment Claims
In Soper (No. 1), the Court was confronted with the following
facts alleged in defendant's removal petition. Several prohibition
agents raided an illegal still. The surprised moonshiners fled. After
an unsuccessful pursuit, the agents returned to the still to destroy
illicit materials. There they discovered a mortally wounded man lying in the path upon which defendants had fled. They brought the
man to local authorities. Upon informing the state's attorney of their
identity as prohibition officers, they were promptly arrested for murder. They denied knowledge of the murder, but argued that they
were entitled to removal because they had found the slain man while
on duty. 0
The Court began with the proposition that removal should be
allowed where the prosecution was based upon acts committed by
the federal official in enforcement of federal law."1 However, over2 the Court concluded that the official need
ruling Fletcher,"
not admit having committed the charged act. Instead, the official could allege facts sufficient to indicate that the prosecution was motivated by
the official's presence performing his duties. The official had to
demonstrate the "causal connection" by: (1) detailing all of his actions and showing that each act was in enforcement or execution of
federal law; and (2) negating the possibility that he was prosecuted
for an act unprotected by federal law.
There must be a "causal connection" between what the officer
has done under asserted official authority and the state prosecution. It must appear that the prosecution of him for whatever
offense has arisen out of the acts done by him under color of
Federal authority and in enforcement of Federal law, and he
79.
80.
81.
82.

270 U.S. 9 (1926).
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 32-33.
22 F. 776 (N.D. Il1. 1884).
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must by direct averment exclude the possibility that it was based
on acts or conduct of his, not justified by his Federal duty. But
the statute does not require that the prosecution must be for the
very acts which the officer admits to have been done by him
under Federal authority. It is enough that his acts or his presence at the place in performance of his official duty constitute
the basis, though mistaken or false, of the state
prosecution...

The defense he is to make is that of his immunity from
punishment by the State, because what he did was justified by
his duty under the Federal law, and because he did nothing else
on which the prosecution could be based."'
By showing that each of his acts was indisputably in enforcement or execution of federal law, the official declared that the prosecution was based either upon: (1) an act protected by a federal defense;84 or (2) his mere presence at the scene while enforcing federal
law. 85
There is nothing new in allowing removal where the official
relies upon a federal defense. However, it is unclear what the Court
intended by allowing removal based upon the official's presence on
the scene. Examination of this alternative means of removal suggests
that Soper (No. 1) was unsound and should be repudiated. For the
reasons stated below, the Court should adopt the Fletcher standard
and require the official to admit having committed the charged act.
The Court in Soper (No. 1) stated that it allowed removal
where the official's "acts or his presence at the place in performance
of his official duty constitute the basis, though mistaken or false, of
the state prosecution." 8 6 At first reading, it appears that the Court in
83. Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. at 33-34 (emphasis added). The Court required an official
to waive his fifth amendment rights and be "candid, specific and positive in explaining his
relation to the transaction growing out of which he has been indicted, and in showing that his
relation to it was confined to his acts as an officer." Id. at 34-35. Such a waiver would not be
necessary if an official could obtain removal solely by stating he was on duty, as such a statement could not be inculpatory.
84. The "causal connection" test also applied where the official acknowledged having
committed the charged act but alleged a federal defense. In the language quoted above, the
Court held that in order to put a federal immunity defense into issue, the official had to negate
any inference that the prosecution could properly be based upon an act unprotected by federal
law. The Court later relaxed this part of the "causal connection" test for the official immunity
defense in civil cases in Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402 (1969). See infra text accompanying note 118.
85. Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. 9 (1926) (language quoted in text).
86. Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
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Soper (No. 1) extended the removal statute to allow removal where
an official could show that a State was motivated by animus toward
federal authority.8 7 However, that phrase also suggests that the
Court would allow removal whenever it appears that the State decided to prosecute because it mistakenly (i.e., in good faith) believed
that the official's, presence performing federal duties was sufficient
evidence of guilt. Under this reading, a motive to harass need not be
present. Thus, the Court posed the hypothetical of a prosecution
commenced
merely on account of the presence of the officer in discharge of
his duties in enforcing the law, at or near the place of the killing, under circumstances casting suspicion of guilt on him. He
may riot even know who did the killing, and yet his being there
and his official activities may have led to the indictment.8 8
The Court stated that "it is enough if the prosecution for murder is
based on or arises out of the acts he did under authority of Federal
law in the discharge of his duty and only by reason thereof."8 9
The problem is that the "mistake" phrase could be read as allowing removal of cases lacking a federal defense. For example, a
defendant in a routine traffic accident could claim that he was prosecuted because of a "mistaken" belief that his performance of a federal duty (i.e., driving) was the cause of the accident. The official's
87. The Court focused upon the indicia of harassment alleged in the petition. Id. at 24
(officials were ordered arrested by the State's Attorney immediately after identifying themselves as prohibition agents).
Before proceeding to discuss other possible meanings of that phrase, it should be noted
that the Court appeared to limit the harassment exception by its ruling in Maryland v. Soper
(No. 2), 270 U.S. 36, 42 (1926), a companion case to Soper (No. 1). In Soper (No..2), the
officials arrested in Soper (No. 1) were brought before an inquest, where they testified concerning the incident. They were then indicted for perjury. The Court denied their petition to
remove the perjury prosecution even while appearing to accept their contention that they were
indicted because of animus toward federal authority. Soper (No. 2), 270 U.S. at 42-43. The
Court found that Congress only intended the removal statute to cover cases where the acts
charged by the prosecution, if committed at all, were committed while the official was on duty
and as a part of those duties. Id. Otherwise, the act motivating prosecution would not have
been committed as an "act under color of office." See 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1982). The Court
denied the petition because the officials had no federal obligation to testify at the inquest, and
were therefore not on duty when they allegedly committed the charged act.
This distinction cuts against the theory that Congress intended the removal statute to
include harassment. If Congress intended to include harassment as grounds for removal, then
any malicious prosecution should be considered a prosecution "for an act under color of office."
Otherwise, a state could preclude removal by manufacturing an incident unrelated to the official's duties (e.g., a vagrancy prosecution).
88. Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. at 33.
89. Id.
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."presence" at the scene would be the "basis" of the prosecution. 9"
However, the language quoted above makes it clear that the
burden is on the official to "exclude the possibility" that the prosecution could be based upon a negligent or intentional act not justified
by federal authority. 91 Thus, the official cannot obtain removal simply by stating that he is not guilty.9 2 But this still leaves open the
possibility that the official may obtain removal upon making a very
strong showing that he did nothing wrong, thus "excluding the possibility" that he committed an act unprotected by federal law.
Thus, we are left with a standard somewhere between a right to
removal for all acts committed while on duty and a requirement that
the official show harassment. Nonetheless, it is possible to derive
from the language of Soper (No. 1) a tentative standard for removing
a "mistaken" prosecution. That standard appears to require a showing of motivation without malice. It seems sufficient to show that the
prosecution was motivated by the official: (1) having been on duty;
and (2) having been employed to enforce federal law.
Thus, the Court in Soper (No. 1) observed that by stating that
they had been arrested upon identifying themselves as prohibition
officers, defendants had averred "circumstances possibly suggesting
the reason and occasion for the criminal charge and the prosecution
against them."" Although the officials had alleged harassment, 4 the
Court may have wanted to construct a remedy for harassment without requiring a federal judge to label it as such. The judge could
instead find that the prosecution had "mistakenly" misconstrued the
official's enforcement of federal law as evidence of guilt, and allow
removal.
While it is clear that the Court in Soper (No. 1) failed to provide guidance on the requirements for a showing of "mistake," the
Court's larger failing was its basic assumption that officials should
be allowed to obtain removal while denying having committed the
charged act. That assumption is inconsistent with the intent of Congress in enacting the removal remedy.
90. The Third Circuit accepted this type of argument in Pennsylvania v. Newcomer,
618 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1980). See infra text accompanying notes 123-28.
91. See supra text accompanying note 83.
92. The Court stated in Soper (No. 1) that an official could not obtain removal merely
by averring that he was on duty when the charged act occurred. Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. at 35.
93. Id. However, the Court denied removal because the officials had not satisfied the
requirement that all of his acts were indisputably in enforcement or execution of federal law;
the officials' averments were vague enough to allow an inference that the agents had shot the
decedent without cause during the raid. Id.
94. Id.
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Congress intended to allow removal where the official asserted a
federal defense requiring construction of federal law.95 In contrast,
the Court sought to allow an official to create an issue of federal law
while refusing to assert facts necessary to put that law in issue. According to Soper (No. 1), by eliminating all other bases for a prosecution, the official showed that his prosecution was based upon an
activity protected by federal law. Thus, he interposed the federal law
protecting that activity as a federal defense.
However, the Court's formulation does not really place a federal defense in issue, as the official's defense at trial will not require
construction of federal law. For example, a claim of malicious prosecution will in practice always assert that the official's enforcement
activities were protected by federal law, as Soper (No. 1) allows the
official to allege that those acts were so protected. The official gets to
choose which federally protected acts allegedly motivated the prosecution. 96 The only question will be whether the prosecution was motivated by those lawful activities. A similar inquiry will occur where
the official claims that the prosecution was motivated by the "mistaken" belief that his enforcement of federal law violated state law.
Furthermore, it makes little difference that the removal proceeding might in some cases turn on what happened, as opposed to
the motivation behind the prosecution. To allow removal upon an
allegation of "mistake" would create an exception swallowing the
federal defense rule. Every official would allege a mistake of fact
"motivating" the prosecution. Congress only intended the removal
remedy to expedite review of state court rulings concerning the applicability and scope of federal law.97 Congress did not contemplate
95. See supra text accompanying notes 33-63.
96. Some observers have interpreted Soper (No. 1) as merely allowing an official to
correct an incorrect recitation of facts in an indictment designed to preclude the official from
claiming a federal defense. See Alabama v. Peak, 252 F. 306 (S.D. Ala. 1918); Amsterdam,
supra note 52, at 881 n.363. But this explanation is unconvincing. By alleging that the state
has deliberately misstated the facts, the federal official is alleging harassment. The federal
official removal statute was intended only to protect against states misinterpreting federal law.
As discussed above (see supra text accompanying notes 33-63), such a harassment claim is
outside the ambit of the statute as envisaged by Congress. Such a claim should be raised by a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Requiring the official to admit having committed the charged act does not require him to
plead guilty to the offense. Cf Peak, 252 F. 306 (S.D. Ala. 1918). Although the official may
admit the actus reus of the offense charged, the whole range of mens rea defenses (lack of
intent, self-defense, etc.) remain available. Requiring the official to incriminate himself to the
extent of admitting the actus reus is not offensive, given that removal is an extraordinary
procedure. Officials requesting a federal forum have to give some indication that federal issues
will be raised and resolved. See Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. at 34 (collected authority).
97. See supra text accompanying notes 33-63.
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federal officials using the removal process to assert that the prosecution was without factual support.
Thus, Soper (No. 1) was wrong when it attempted to allow removal without admission of the charged act. Where the state relies
upon the official's legitimate performance of federal duties as a motive for the prosecution, then the official has been harassed. As discussed in a later section, the appropriate remedy for such a violation
of the Constitution is not removal, but a writ of habeas corpus.
That having been said, however, the fact remains that the Court
in Soper (No. 1) stated that removal would be available for those
officials who denied having committed the charged act. This error
created confusion which ultimately resulted in one circuit eliminating
the federal defense requirement.98 The catalyst for that ruling was
the expansion of the federal official immunity defense.
B.

The Federal Official Immunity Defense Changes the Landscape

The federal official immunity doctrine traditionally shielded
legislative and judicial officials for acts performed as part of their
official functions.9 9 But in 1959, the Court expanded that doctrine to
shield all federal officials in civil suits.'0 0 Federal official immunity
relies upon the status of the official in allowing him to commit certain discretionary acts with immunity. Those acts are not in enforcement of federal law, but enjoy protection for policy reasons.
This new defense was different from other "federal defenses"
because the official was not required to allege that his acts were committed in furtherance of federal law. Rather, the defense depended
only upon the scope of the official's authority to act. The official
alleging a "normal" federal defense averred that federal law gave
him the right to act. The official immunity defense was only concerned with the official's power to act.
The official immunity defense was a federal defense because it
immunized federal officials from civil suits brought in state courts.
The Supremacy Clause gave the official the right to have his immunity defense heard in federal court. Most important for our purposes,
officials could easily put this federal defense in issue: the official
needed only to aver that he was acting in performance of his official
duties.' '
98. See infra text accompanying notes 123-28.
99. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
100. Id.
101. It was not until recently that the Supreme Court resolved a split among the circuits
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This new federal official immunity defense had unforeseen consequences for removal jurisdiction. Although such a federal defense
belonged in federal court, section 1442(a)(1) allowed removal only
for acts "under color of office." Did a discretionary act performed
while on duty qualify as an act "under color of office?" The Supreme Court in Soper (No. 1) had rejected the idea that removal
could be obtained solely upon the allegation that the charged act was
committed while on duty. 102 However, under the new official immunity doctrine, such an allegation apparently established a federal defense. The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Willingham v.
08
Morgan.
Plaintiff inmates in Willingham sued their doctor and warden
for intentional torts. The doctor and warden petitioned for removal,
alleging that all of their contacts with the inmates arose out of their
conduct while on duty. The lower court followed Soper (No. 1) literally and denied removal because the officials did not negate the inference that they had committed an act unprotected by federal law. Although the lower court was presented with the federal defense of
official immunity, it did not recognize that defense as falling within
the ambit of section 1442(a)(1). The lower court separated the federal defense of official immunity defense from section 1442(a)(1) by
holding that "[t]he test for removal is not the same as the test for
immunity for the former is much narrower than the latter."''
The Supreme Court faced a dilemma when presented with the
lower court's decision in Willingham. Removal jurisdiction had to be
broad enough to allow the official immunity defense to be litigated in
federal court. But general federal question removal jurisdiction'
could not be invoked because the official immunity defense was not
implied in the inmates' complaint. And the Court had already held
that the federal official removal statute did not protect officials solely
because of their status as officials or because they were on duty when
the incident occurred.""
by deciding that the official needed to demonstrate that his act was discretionary. See Westfall
v. Erwin, 108 S. Ct. 580 (1988).
102. See Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. 9, 35 (1926) (rejecting petition because
"these averments amount to hardly more than to say [the charged act] was at a time when they
were engaged in performing their official duties").
103. 395 U.S. 402 (1969).
104. Morgan v. Willingham, 383 F.2d 139, 142 (10th Cir. 1967). The court followed
other decisions holding that "under color of office" required a defense based upon federal law
or authority, and did not encompass all acts performed while on duty. Id. (collected authority).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982).
106. "Federal officers and employees are not, merely because they are such, granted
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The solution to this dilemma appears simple in hindsight. The
history of section 1442(a)(1) indicates that Congress intended to protect the Supremacy Clause by preventing state adjudication of federal
law where federal officials were defendants. The official immunity
defense is also a federal defense depending upon federal law. The
Court should have simply announced that this new defense was
within the original, albeit broader, intent of Congress to protect the
Supremacy Clause. The Court then could have turned to the question of what showing would be required to put the new defense in
issue.' ° The issue of whether removal jurisdiction was "narrower"
than the breadth of the official immunity defense would have
disappeared.
The Court in Willingham arrived at this result but did not take
the right path to get there. The Court failed to distinguish between
the old and new bases for removal. Instead, it attempted to fit the
official immunity defense into the old framework of removal for acts
enforcing federal law. By trying to graft the new defense onto an
older and different analytical structure, the Court created confusion
over the definition of a federal defense and the requirements for putting such defenses in issue.
The Court began by summarizing the history of section
1442(a)(1), characterizing the intent of Congress as preventing inter1 0 8 But the Court never
ference with enforcement of federal law.
made the leap from an intent to protect acts in furtherance of federal
law to an intent to prevent state adjudication of any defense relying
upon federal law. Thus, the Court stated that federal jurisdiction
rested on "the very basic interest in the enforcement of federal law
through federal officials." ' 0 9 The statute was "at least" broad
enough "to cover all cases where federal officers can raise a colorable
'
The
defense arising out of their duty to enforce federal law."
immunity from prosecution in state courts for crimes against state law." Colorado v. Symes,
236 U.S. 510, 518 (1932).
107. See infra text accompanying notes 108-16.
108. Thus, the 1815 statute was seen as "part of an attempt to enforce an embargo,"
allowing "federal officials involved in the enforcement of the customs statute to remove." Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 405 (1969) (emphasis added). The 1863 and 1866 Acts
"were eventually codified into a permanent statute which applied mainly to cases growing out
of enforcement of the revenue laws." Id. at 405-06 (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 406 (emphasis added).
110. At the very least, it is broad enough to cover all cases where federal officers
can raise a colorable defense arising out of their duty to enforce federal law.
One of the primary purposes of the removal statute-as its history clearly demonstrates-was to have such defenses litigated in the federal courts.
Id. at 406-07 (emphasis added).
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Court failed to demonstrate that Congress actually intended to protect the new defense, which was based, not upon the official's enforcement of federal law, but upon a policy protecting all acts within
the official's authority whether or not those acts were justifiable
under federal law.
The Court instead focused upon the absurdity of the lower
court's result: a system where removal jurisdiction was not broad
enough to encompass cases presenting a valid federal defense. Without any visible support, the Court stated that "Congress certainly
meant more than this (the present system) when it chose the words
'under color of. . . office.' ""' Foregoing the opportunity to clarify
this area by finding that Congress intended the statute to include all
cases invoking the Supremacy Clause, the Court simply finessed the
problem by forbidding "a narrow, grudging interpretation of the
statute.""1 2
The criticism of this failure could be dismissed as academic
nitpicking, except that the Court's decision not to distinguish between the old and new defenses had several practical consequences.
After deciding that the official immunity defense was removable
upon a proper showing, the Court had to decide just how the defense
The Court in Mesa was careful to redact the italicized words in the passage above when
it relied on the same passage as supporting the federal defense requirement. California v.
Mesa, 57 U.S.L.W. 4199, 4203 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1989) (No. 87-1206).
The Court in Willingham held that all federal defenses were encompassed by the federal
official removal statute, including official immunity. The Court also apparently intended to
allow officials to obtain removal by "colorably" alleging, as opposed to proving, their federal
defense. However, the language quoted above could also be read as preserving an unidentified
category of cases where officials could obtain removal without alleging a federal defense.
111. Willingham, 395 U.S. at 407. The Court also stated that "in fact, one of the most
important reasons for removal is to have the validity of the defense of official immunity tried in
a federal court." Id. Although correct, the Court never stated the source for that statement, nor
did it cite to legislative history indicating that Congress contemplated such a defense in 1815 or
at the time of subsequent enactments.
112. Id. The Court concluded that "[i]n cases like this one, Congress has decided that
federal officers, and indeed the Federal Government itself, require the protection of a federal
forum. This policy should not be frustrated by a narrow, grudging interpretation of §
1442(a)(1)." Id.
The Court's statement is circular. Willingham was not a Tort Claims Act case. Defendants relied on the official immunity defense. Id. at 404. The defense of official immunity was
not created by Congress-it was a judicial creation. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
Thus, when the Court stated that Congress had decided that the federal government needed
the protection of a federal forum, it had to have been referring to section 1442(a)(1). The
statement boils down to an assertion that Congress had intended section 1442(a)(1) to encompass these defenses. But the Court never presented evidence supporting that conclusion, particularly since the official immunity defense was practically non-existent in 1815. Instead of implying that Congress had contemplated protecting a defense based on status, the Court should
have found that Congress intended section 1442(a)(1) to effectuate the Supremacy Clause.
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could be put in issue. By failing to distinguish between old and new
bases for removal, the Court had to use the same rules for determining how the official immunity defense could be alleged.
The old rules assumed that the official had an obligation to establish a "causal connection" between his acts and his enforcement
or execution of federal law. But the "causal connection" test was
essentially irrelevant for determining whether an official immunity
defense had been put in issue. The only requirement for official immunity had been that the official was performing his duties."' But
the Willingham Court attempted to fit the immunity defense into the
"causal connection" mold with disastrous results.
The Court noted that Soper (No. 1) required an official who did
not admit the charged act to detail each of his acts in relation to the
suit or prosecution. This presented particular difficulties in Willingham, where the warden and prison doctor would have had many
contacts with each plaintiff inmate.' To require such officials to
detail each contact would have required voluminous removal petitions. Accordingly, the Court held that for a civil suit, "it was sufficient for petitioners to have shown their relationship to respondent
derived solely from their official duties.""" This result made sense
because the defendants showed that all acts were committed within
the scope of employment,"' and therefore established the defense of
official immunity. Had the Court based its holding on that reasoning, no harm would have resulted.
Unfortunately, the Court found it necessary to employ the
"causal connection" test out of context. Worse, it used only a portion
of the test. The Court explained:
Past cases have interpreted the 'color of office' test to require a
113. When Willingham was decided, it was at least unclear that the official immunity
defense covered only discretionary acts. It was assumed in Willingham that the warden and
the doctor had the discretion to impose medical treatment. However, the Court's decision in
Westfall v. Erwin, 108 S. Ct. 580 (1988), complicates matters. If the official immunity defense
now only protects discretionary acts, does each official sued civilly have to assert that each of
his acts with respect to plaintiff(s) was discretionary in order to obtain removal? This question
remains to be resolved. If the official must show that his acts were discretionary, the official
might have to present evidence at the evidentiary hearing demonstrating the discretionary nature of his contacts with plaintiff. Merely alleging that he was on duty at all times may no
longer suffice.
Given that the discretionary nature of the act is now one of the elements of the official
immunity, it seems fair to require the official to make a "colorable" showing that his acts were
in fact discretionary.

114. 395 U.S. at 408-09.
115.
116.

Id. at 409.
Id.
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showing of a 'causal connection' between the charged conduct
and asserted official authority. Maryland v. Soper (No. 1),
supra, at 33. 'It is enough that [petitioners'] acts or [their] presence at the place in performance of [their] official duty constitute the basis, though mistaken or false, of the state prosecution.' In this case, once petitioners had shown that their only
contact with respondent occurred inside the penitentiary, while
they were performing their duties, we believe that they had
demonstrated the required 'causal connection'. The connection
consists, simply enough, of the undisputed fact that petitioners
were on duty, at their place of federal employment, at all the
17
relevant times.1
The Court in Willingham gave the "presence" language a
double meaning. The language originally was part of the discussion
about how officials could establish a federal defense where they
lacked knowledge of the incident, but averred that all of their acts
were in enforcement or execution of federal law. The Court in Soper
(No. 1) used "performance of official duty" to mean enforcement of
federal law. The Court in Willingham used "performance of official
duty" to mean "committing an act while on duty," without any connection to the enforcement or execution of federal law. In addition,
the Court did not state that its reasoning applied only to the official
immunity defense, thereby suggesting that it had redefined the test
for putting all federal defenses in issue.
Moreover, the problem could not be confined to the question of
how a defense is put into issue since that question defines the standard for removal. If all federal defenses can be placed into issue by
showing that the official was on duty, then any case can be removed
upon that allegation. Once the case is removed, there is no requirement that the federal official rely upon a particular defense; he may
require the plaintiff or prosecution to prove its case and overcome
any defense as in any other trial. Thus, Willingham could be read as
having abolished the federal defense requirement.
The Court's discussion of the "causal connection" test was
largely confined to civil cases. The Court relaxed the Soper (No. 1)
"causal connection" test for civil cases while still retaining the federal defense requirement. Soper (No. 1) required all officials, even
those who admitted having committed the act and justified that act as
executing or enforcing federal law, to negate any inference that the
prosecution could properly be based upon an act unprotected by fed117. Id. (quoting Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. 9 (1926)) (bracketed material
appears in Willingham) (emphasis added).
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eral law.1 1 But such a test posed administrative difficulties in civil
cases such as Willingham. The need for a high standard was also
less important because the official immunity defense was so easily
established. Thus, the Court lowered the showing needed in civil
cases by requiring only a "colorable" showing of a federal defense.
But, in a footnote, the court briefly addressed the appropriate
standard for criminal cases. It noted:
Were this a criminal case, a more detailed showing might be
necessary because of the more compelling state interest in conducting criminal trials in the state courts. Cf Colorado v.
Symes, supra; Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), supra." 9

Unfortunately, this comment did not make the Court's view sufficiently clear. The Court did not explain what it meant by "a more
detailed showing." The footnote appeared to group official immunity, available only in civil cases, with all other federal defenses.
That grouping suggested that the "more detailed showing" would
apply to all defenses without differentiation. This in turn suggested
that an official could still remove a criminal prosecution by averring
that he was on duty without alleging a federal defense, so long as he
made "a more detailed" showing concerning his activities.
Thus, a postal official charged with vehicular manslaughter
could allege that he was driving a postal vehicle when the accident
occurred. Although this would suffice in a civil case, the footnote
suggests that more is required in a criminal case. However, since
Willingham can be read as holding that the official would not have
to prove that he was innocent in order to remove his case, the footnote would not seem to require the official to show that he was not
negligent or that his acts were justified by federal law. The stricter
showing might only require the official to negate the possibility that
he was somehow not performing his duty (i.e. that he was intoxi118. See supra text accompanying note 83. Requiring the federal official to negate the
inference that he committed a crime makes removal very difficult. The Court's application of
this standard in Colorado v. Symes, 286 U.S. 510 (1932), indicates that the petition alone, no
matter how complete, cannot satisfy the heavy burden of demonstrating that the official did not
commit the crime. Defendant prohibition officer was arrested for murder after he struck a bar
patron with his gun when the patron resisted arrest. Although the officer stated that: (1) he
seized a bottle of wine from the suspect as evidence and arrested the suspect; (2) the suspect
attempted to destroy the bottle; (3) the suspect attempted to assault the officer and that a
scuffle ensued; and (4) the officer struck the suspect with his gun in order to subdue him and
prevent him from destroying evidence, the Court found the petition "so vague, indefinite and
uncertain as not to commit petitioner in respect of essential details of the defense he claims."
Id. at 516, 521.
119. Willingham v. Morgan. 395 U.S. 402, 409 n.4 (1969) (emphasis added).
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cated or on his lunch break)."' 0 The foolishness of this example suggests that the footnote might mean something more profound.1" 1 But
the Court's failure to explain itself meant that later courts would
either ignore or misinterpret the footnote.' 22
C.

The Lower Courts Abolish the Federal Defense Requirement

The potential for misinterpretation of Willingham was realized
in 1980 when the Third Circuit proclaimed the federal defense requirement extinct. In Pennsylvania v. Newcomer, 8 a mail carrier
struck and killed a pedestrian while driving a mail route. The official petitioned for removal on the ground that he was on duty when
the accident occurred.
The Third Circuit relied upon two arguments in dismantling
the federal defense requirement. First, the court incorrectly stated
that the original removal statutes "were enacted not so much to provide federal forums for federal defenses, as to protect federal officers
from interference with the operations of federal government by the
state."' 24 The Supreme Court in Willingham did not suggest that
120. Or, on a more serious note, that his acts in driving the vehicle were clearly connected with his official duty. See Virginia v. Harvey, 571 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Va. 1983).
Although the district court interpreted Willingham to require a federal defense in criminal
cases, it did so by holding that footnote 4 required it to ignore the "causal connection" test and
by reading a federal defense requirement into Justice Black's concurring opinion.
This author does not follow the district court's interpretation of Justice Black's concurring
opinion. Justice Black believed the majority's comparison between the breadth of the right to
remove with the right to official immunity unnecessary. This is puzzling because that comparison provides the basis for the Court's conclusion that Congress intended the federal official
removal statute to encompass federal immunity cases. Perhaps Justice Black intended to rest
his decision on the requirement that all federal defenses be removable as an incident of federal
supremacy. This would justify reading the federal defense requirement into his opinion. However, this author cannot read such a major divergence from the majority's reasoning into such a
cryptic concurring opinion.
121. The Court did not decide whether to relax the test for putting a federal defense in
issue for criminal cases. It appears that some relaxation of the standard is needed because it is
so difficult to negate any possible inference of wrongdoing. See supra note 118. Given the need
to ensure that federal law is adjudicated by federal courts, the official should be required to
demonstrate a "colorable" (i.e., plausible) defense at the evidentiary hearing. Indeed, the Court
in Mesa appeared to assume that the "colorable" standard governs in criminal cases. California v. Mesa, 57 U.S.L.W. 4199 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1989) (No. 87-1206).
122. See infra text accompanying notes 123-32.
123. 618 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1980).
124. Id. at 250 (citing Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1880)). As discussed earlier,
Davis does not support that proposition. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
The court also cited Amsterdam, supra note 52. This excellent article touches on section
1442 in its discussion of the civil rights removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1982)). Professor
Amsterdam did not support the Third Circuit's interpretation of congressional intent, although
he noted that Congress intended to protect both federal law and federal officials. See Amster-
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view of legislative intent and the Third Circuit presented no legislative history supporting it.
Indeed, the Third Circuit's second argument contradicted its
first by implying that the elimination of the federal defense requirement was not required by an analysis of congressional intent, but
was compelled by Willingham. The Circuit stated that although the
official did not allege a defense based upon enforcement of federal
law, "the liberal construction to be afforded the statute . . . and the
interpretation of 'color of office' supplied by Willingham compel our
result in this case." 12 Specifically, the court relied upon the maxim
from Willingham and Soper (No. 1) that the official need not admit
that he committed the charged acts. But at this point, the Court diverged from the Soper (No. 1) analysis.
As the Court noted in Soper, removal would be available to an
officer who denied any relationship to the charged offense. In
such a case, of course, the denial does not involve a federal
defense. We therefore believe that the appropriate standard is
not the presence of a federal defense, but rather, as applied in
Willingham v. Morgan, the causal connection between the
charged conduct and federal authority, a connection which we
believe exists in this case."
Of course, Soper (No. 1) indicates that the denial must be accompanied by sufficient facts to allege a connection between the prosecution and enforcement of federal law. The official raises the feddam, supra note 52, at 807-08 n.70. The court failed to cite Amsterdam's remark that a
defendant seeking removal under section 1442(a)(1) must show colorable protection under federal law. Amsterdam, supra note 52, at 874 n.328 (citing Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1880)).
125. Newcomer, 618 F.2d at 250. But the "liberal corstruction" of section 1442(a)(1)
was intended only to require district courts to allow removal to all officials presenting a federal
defense. The genesis of the "liberal construction" requirement was Colorado v. Symes, 286
U.S. 510 (1932).
The various acts of Congress constituting the section as it now stands were enacted to maintain the supremacy of the laws of the United States by safeguarding officers and other acting under federal authority against peril of punishment for violation of state law or obstruction or embarrassment by reason of
opposing policy on the part of those exerting or controlling state power. [Citations omitted]. It scarcely need be said that such measures are to be liberally
construed to give full effect to the purposesfor which they were enacted.
Id. at 517 (emphasis added). Although this "liberal" construction was limited in Symes to cases
presenting a federal defense, that limitation was omitted by the Court in Willingham without
explanation. The Court in Willingham, citing Symes, stated only that the statute should be
construed liberally. Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402 (1969). However, the Court was
deciding that the statute had to be construed liberally in order to encompass a previously
unrecognized federal defense.
126. Newcomer, 618 F.2d at 250 (emphasis added).
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eral defense as part of his denial.
But the Third Circuit relied upon the Soper (No. 1) "causal
connection" language as interpreted by Willingham. In Willingham,
the federal official could obtain removal by denying the act without
alleging enforcement of federal law. Such a denial, accompanied by
an allegation that the official was on duty, presented a federal defense for that civil case. Such a denial in the criminal case did not
present a federal defense. But because Willingham failed to distinguish between defenses based upon enforcement of federal law and
defenses based upon performance of duty, the Third Circuit took the
standard employed in Willingham as applying to all cases.127
The Third Circuit applied the "causal connection" test to the
petition in Newcomer, and held that the mail carrier satisfied the test
by alleging that he was on duty.128 The Third Circuit would not
have abolished the federal defense requirement had it read Soper
(No. 1) in context. Although the Willingham footnote cautioned
against applying its version of the "causal connection" test to criminal cases, the Third Circuit ignored its warning.
The Sixth Circuit soon announced that a federal defense was no
longer required after Newcomer. In Stein-Sapir v. Birdsell,'29 a federal parks official was sued civilly for libel based upon a press interview. He sought removal under section 1442(a)(1) and apparently
relied upon the official immunity doctrine.'
The Sixth Circuit
properly followed Willingham in allowing removal, but nevertheless
127. The color of office test has repeatedly been interpreted to require a 'causal
connection' between the charged conduct and asserted official authority. [quoting
Soper (No. 1) and Willingham] It is enough that petitioner's acts or his presence
at the place in performance of his official duty constitute the basis, though mistaken or false, of the state prosecution. [quoting Soper (No. 1) and Wilingham].
So, for example, in Willingham . . the prison warden was held to have satisfied this causal connection merely by the fact that he was on duty, at his place of
employment, at all relevant times. [citing Willingham]. Similarly, we believe
that the defendant has satisfactorily demonstrated . . . the necessary causal connection in this case between his federal authority to drive a postal truck and the
acts involved in the accident which are the basis of the instant prosecution, acts
which occurred while he was acting as an employee of the postal service, while
driving a postal truck, within the scope of his office.
Id. at 249-50.
The court distinguished earlier cases by stating that they were decided before Willingham. Id. at 250.
128. See supra note 127.
129. 673 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1982).
130. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). The issue was never reached because
defendant prevailed on a defense based upon Ohio law under which the death of a party abates
the action. Stein-Sapir, 673 F.2d at 167.
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contributed to the confusion. Plaintiff had cited several cases denying
removal which pre-dated the expansion of the official immunity doctrine.' 1 Instead of distinguishing those cases by noting that defendant in the instant case possessed the federal defense of official immunity, the court inexplicably cited Newcomer and noted that "[s]ince
Morgan, at least one circuit has held allegations of a federal defense
are not essential for removal.' ' 2
D. The Ninth Circuit Restores Order Without Resolving the
Confusion
The validity of the federal defense requirement was revisited
but unsatisfactorily resolved in 1987 by the Ninth Circuit in California v. Mesa.' Although the Ninth Circuit wisely declined to follow
Newcomer, it still failed to provide a convincing interpretation of
congressional intent. The Circuit characterized section 1442(a) as a
"balance between state sovereignty and federal interests,""3 4 but
stopped short of holding that Congress intended to require a federal
defense for removal in all cases. The Circuit ultimately relied upon
Soper (No. 1) and Willingham in holding that a federal defense was
required to remove criminal prosecutions against postal workers. 3
The Circuit declined to follow Newcomer because it believed that the
Willingham footnote distinguishing civil and criminal cases meant
that "Willingham's broad reading of 'under color of office' cannot be
casually imported into the criminal arena."'3 6 Thus, it concluded
that something more was required for removal in criminal cases.
However, once the Circuit decided to rely upon the Willingham
footnote, it had to address the issue left untouched by the Supreme
Court in that case: what constitutes the "more detailed showing" required to remove criminal cases?
The Circuit could have held that this showing always requires
131. Id. at 166 (citing People v. Banning, 88 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Mich. 1950); Ampey
v. Thornton, 65 F. Supp. 216 (D.C. Minn. 1946)).
132. Id. at 166-67. See also People of Puerto Rico v. Santos-Marrerro, 624 F. Supp.
308 (D.P.R. 1985). The court offered no independent analysis of the issue presented in this
article. But see Virginia v. Harvey, 571 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Va. 1983), which reached a
contrary conclusion without even mentioning Newcomer.
133. 813 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1987).
134. Id. at 964.
135. Id. at 964-67. Although the Circuit suggested that Congress always "balanced the
perceived federal interests of the time against the states' traditional right to enforce their criminal laws in their own courts," it did not suggest that Congress intended to require a federal
defense in all cases. Id. at964.
136. Id. at 966.
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a federal defense per Soper (No. 1).187 Instead, the Ninth Circuit's
decision referred only to postal workers.'" 8 A careful reading of that
decision suggests that the reference to postal workers alone reflected
more than judicial reluctance to pass on questions not yet presented.
The Ninth Circuit apparently decided that the "more detailed showing" required by Willingham should be defined by balancing the
federal and state interests in each case. The federal interest in removing routine traffic infractions did not overcome the state's interest
in maintaining traffic safety."3 9 However, the Circuit was careful to
suggest that different facts might compel a different result, hinting
that concern over state animus toward federal substantive law or a
particular class of federal employees might tip the balance." 0°
137. 270 U.S. 9 (1926). Although this author believes it to be an incorrect reading of
Willingham, assume for the moment that footnote 4 refers to the issue of whether a federal
defense is required for a particular case. There appear to be two ways to interpret that footnote. First, the note could be read as an expression of uncertainty. The Court could have
meant that if a different standard is required for criminal cases ("a detailed showing might be
necessary"), then the standard will be higher. Thus, the Ninth Circuit could have held: (1)
such a standard is required for a criminal case; and (2) that standard is the Soper (No. 1)
standard.
Or, that note could be seen as allowing a case-by-case determination of whether the federal interest presented in each case is so strong as to overcome the state's interest in its own
sovereignty. The Ninth Circuit apparently pursued the latter course.
138. "Because of the states' compelling interest in the administration of their criminal
justice systems, we hold that federal postal workers may not remove state criminal prosecutions to federal court when they raise no colorable claim of federal immunity or other federal
defense." Mesa, 813 F.2d at 967 (emphasis added).
139. Congress could not have intended 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) to turn the federal courts into a special traffic court for federal employees. Whatever remote
federal interests are implicated by state traffic regulation of postal vehicles, the
overcrowded district courts do not need a new category of pesky cases turning
solely on state law. The cost and inconvenience to the state of enforcing petty
traffic infractions (only to receive nominal fines) and driving misdemeanors in
federal court may lead them to curtail, or even forgo, prosecution of these offenses when committed by federal postal workers. We do not believe that Congress intended the federal officer removal statute to infringe so drastically upon
the states' ability to keep their neighborhood streets safe.
Id. at 967.
Although at first glance this might appear to be an interpretation of congressional intent,
the court only mentioned legislative history in connection with its decision that Congress intended to balance state sovereignty and federal interests. Id. at 964. The Circuit appears to
have balanced the particular interests in the case before it, holding that the federal interests
presented were of too little weight to change the usual requirement of a federal defense mandated in criminal cases according to Soper (No. 1). See, e.g., Note, Removal of Suits Against
Federal Officers: Does the Malfeasant Mailman Merit A FederalForum, 88 COLUM. L. REv.
1098 n.66 (suggesting that the federal interest in removing civil suits is stronger because of the
risk to the federal fisc).
140. The best evidence that the Circuit adopted a balancing test is that it expressly
confined its holding to postal employees. See Mesa, 813 F.2d at 967. There was no reason to
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Although the Ninth Circuit solved one of the problems created
by Newcomer by eliminating removal of routine offenses committed
while on duty, it created another. The problem resulted from the
Ninth Circuit's failure to determine legislative intent. The distinction
between civil and criminal prosecutions is based upon reluctance to
override the strong state interest in sovereignty over enforcement of
its laws.141 The federal interest in removal is subordinate in some
cases to this stronger interest, at least to the extent of requiring a
greater "showing" for removal. 42 It follows that there may be cases
where the federal interest is so compelling as to abolish the federal
defense requirement even in criminal cases.1 4 The Ninth Circuit
suggested that such determinations should be made, at least in some
confine the holding to postal workers; a ruling based upon Soper (No. 1) should have encompassed all federal employees (with the exception of court officers, who are covered under section 1442(a)(3)). The Circuit declined to issue such a sweeping ruling because of its concern
that other employees might present stronger federal interests, particularly those employees
more likely to encounter state hostility. The Circuit indicated its view of the balance in that
instant case.
Although a fear of state court prejudice certainly played a role in the evolution
of § 1442(a)(1), the Supreme Court has never indicated that this interest alone
would justify removal of a state criminal prosecution. Moreover, this federal
interest would be more compelling in the context of civil rights law or some
realm of federal authority likely to encounter antagonism in state court. There is
simply no reason to believe that, on a systematic basis, postal workers will not
get a fair shake in state court.
Id. at 966-67 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The Circuit's opinion suggests that a showing of past clashes between state authority and
a particular class of federal officials would affect the balance. Note that this is different from
allegations by individual officials that their prosecutions were motivated by animus. The Circuit made a judgment in advance that certain officials are unlikely to encounter animus. That
judgment could be different for other groups of officials (e.g., IRS, OSHA, or EPA officials),
suggesting that such officials might not have to allege a federal defense. For example, the
Ninth Circuit's opinion might be read as justifying removal of all prosecutions against federal
civilians engaged in national security projects.
It is not entirely clear that the Circuit intended to employ a balancing approach. However, the limitation of its holding to a single group of officials, combined with its finding of an
absence of state animus toward those federal officials, suggests that at the very least the Circuit
did not wish to commit future courts to rigidly applying the federal defense requirement. The
problem is that if Soper (No. 1) is not always the standard, what is the standard and how is it
derived?
141. Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 409 n.4 (1969). The court in Mesa characterized the state's interest in maintaining its ability to enforce its criminal laws as "the
centermost pillar of sovereignty." Mesa, 813 F.2d at 966.
142. Willingham, 395 U.S. at 409 n.4.
143. In Willingham, the distinction between civil and criminal cases extended only to
the showing required to put the federal defense in issue. See supra text accompanying notes
114-21. The Ninth Circuit suggested that the federal defense requirement itself depended
upon whether the case was civil or criminal.

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

instances, on a case-by-case basis.' But there were no guidelines
available for evaluating that federal interest. There should be more
certainty when determining the existence of federal jurisdiction."
More importantly, this test ignored the intent of Congress. Congress created section 1442(a) as a way of balancing federal and state
interests. Congress established the federal defense requirement to ensure a balance between those interests. Recasting or "refining" that
balance must be left to Congress.
E. The Supreme Court Reaffirms the Federal Defense
Requirement But Fails to Solve the Harassment Problem
The Supreme Court in Mesa played safe by relying on its own
precedents in affirming the Ninth Circuit's decision and reaffirming
the validity of the federal defense requirement.' 4" The Court saw no
need to reach other issues because the federal officials in the cases
had not alleged harassment. 47 The Court found that the early cases
such as The Mayor v. Cooper"' and Tennessee v. Davis" made
clear the Court's fidelity to the federal defense requirement. 50 The
Court correctly found that its later cases, while less clear on the subject, nonetheless demonstrated that the Court had always assumed
the validity of the federal defense requirement. 5' Unfortunately, the
52
Court did little to clarify the original intent of Congress.'
144. At least one other court has denied removal because "the federal government's interest in having petitioner tried in this court is so remote, compared to the state's interest in
safeguarding the public from dangerous drivers." Georgia v. Waller, 660 F. Supp. 952, 954
(M.D. Ga. 1987). Although applying the Ninth Circuit's analysis, that opinion was not cited,
possibly because it had not yet been published in the official reports.
145. A balancing test would be entirely subjective, leaving federal judges too much discretion in deciding what cases should be removed. Their evaluations of federal interests can be
unpredictable. In Mesa, the district court judge stated that he believed removal was proper
because of the paramount federal interest in mail delivery. Reporter's Transcript of Hearing
on the People of the State of California's Opposition to Petition for Removal and Motion for
Remand at 5-6, 8:21-25, Mesa, 813 F.2d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 1987). Federal jurisdiction should
not vary from one judge to another. Inconsistency would be the hallmark of such a system, and
states would have legitimate fears that federal interests would receive undue deference by federal judges. Finally, each" case would present a different balance of interests and could require
a time-consuming hearing in district court.
146. 57 U.S.L.W. 4199 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1989) (No. 87-1206).
147. Id. at 4204.
148. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247 (1867); see supra text accompanying note 53.
149. 100 U.S. 257 (1880); see supra text accompanying note 61.
150. Mesa, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4201.
151. Id. at 4201-03.
152. The Court relied almost entirely upon its precedents. The only interpretation of
legislative history concerned the 1916 Act. Id. at 4203; see supra text accompanying notes 6471. The Court ruled that the 1916 Act did not eliminate the federal defense requirement
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However, the Court was aware of the harassment problem. The
Court distinguished Soper (No. 1) as "a unique criminal prosecution,
markedly unlike those before us today, where a federal officer
pleaded by traverse and sought removal."'' " Although the Court specifically declined to pass on the validity of Soper (No. 1),"" the concurring opinion by Justices Brennan and Marshall 5' appears to endorse that decision as a remedy for harassment.5 5 Emphasizing that
"the days of widespread resistance by state and local governmental
authorities to acts of Congress and to decisions of this Court in the
areas of school desegregation and voting rights are not so distant,'" 57Justice Brennan suggested that Congress might have intended section 1442(a)(1) to encompass harassment claims.' 5 " Justice
Brennan stated that the Court had not foreclosed the possibility that
the Soper (No. 1) "causal connection" test15 would allow removal of
harassment claims.' 60
Thus, the Court's decision leaves the harassment issue unresolved. In addition, the federal government may seek to protect its
officials against any possibility of harassment by requesting Congress
to amend the statute to: (1) abrogate the federal defense requirement;
or (2) retain the requirement, but allow harassment as a grounds for
removal.
The second potential amendment will be addressed in the section discussing habeas corpus.' The first amendment merits discussion because the Court in Mesa missed an opportunity to insulate the
federal defense requirement from amendment and clearly define the
limits of article III jurisdiction.' 6 2 The next section sets forth the
argument that the federal defense requirement is not just a creation
of Congress that can be eliminated by amendment, but an immutable
boundary defined by and coextensive with the federal jurisdiction
recognized in the Court's earlier decisions. Id. The Court did not discuss the Acts of 1815,
1833, or 1863 at all. Id.
153. Id. at 4202.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 4202-05 (Brennan, J., concurring).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 4205.
158. Id.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 76-98.
160. Mesa, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4205 (Brennan, J., concurring).
161. See infra text accompanying notes 222-32.
162. Although the court stated that the absence of a federal defense posed "grave constitutional problems" (Mesa, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4204 ), it did not resolve those problems. Rather, it
acted prudently in relying upon the gravity of the constitutional problem as justifying a construction of section 1442(a)(1) requiring a federal defense. Id.
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provided by article III.
IV.

ARTICLE

III JURISDICTION DOES NOT ENCOMPASS

FEDERAL OFFICIALS ACTING IN THEIR PRIVATE CAPACITIES

Article III jurisdiction extends only to cases "arising under" the
laws or Constitution of the United States." 8 On its face, article III
does not allow removal of cases lacking a federal defense because the
official cannot present an issue of federal law."" The federal defense
requirement is critical because it alone supplies the federal issue necessary for jurisdiction. 6 Although article III has always been interpreted broadly to allow federal enforcement of the Supremacy
Clause, the federal defense requirement is coextensive with the
Clause. There is no clash between state and federal authority where
the federal official presents no federal defense. Thus, section 1442(a),
properly construed, is a boundary line for article III jurisdiction.
However, the boundaries of article III jurisdiction have been
hotly contested and the dissenting judge at the Ninth Circuit in Mesa
stated that he would have found federal jurisdiction on two
grounds. 6 6 First, he reasoned that the case "arose under" article III
because the official was employed to perform duties that were authorized by federal law." 7 Second, he suggested that even if the case
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
164. It should be noted that article III would encompass cases where the official asserts
a claim of harassment as a defense, and that such cases are not discussed in this section. An
amendment adding harassment as a grounds for removal would satisfy article III because such
cases arise under the Supremacy Clause. Such an amendment is addressed in the section of this
article discussing habeas corpus. See infra text accompanying notes 222-32.
165. See, e.g., Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963) ("[Rlemoval is possible
in a nondiversity case such as this one only because the interpretation of a federal defense
makes the case one 'arising under' the Constitution or laws of the United States."). Thus, the
Supreme Court held that suits involving federal receivers do not arise under the laws or Constitution of the United States where there is no reliance upon federal court orders or laws. See
Gay v. Ruff, 292 U.S. 25 (1934), and cases cited therein. Although the Court in both Wheeldin and Ruff was referring to the general federal question statute, which is currently construed
more narrowly than article III (see Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480,
495 (1983)), these cases still suggest that a federal defense is necessary for federal jurisdiction.
166. A case based on the act of a federal employee acting within the scope of his
employment arises under the Constitution, which creates the authority to authorize his work, and under the laws of the United States that do authorize it,
that make him a federal employee within a federal program with a federal
function.
Mesa, 813 F.2d at 968 (J. Noonan, dissenting) (citing Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824)).
167. Id. Section 1442(a) cannot itself confer federal jurisdiction because statutes which
do no more than "confer a new jurisdiction on the district courts" cannot enlarge the boundaries of article III. Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 496 (quoting The Propeller Genesee Chief v.
163.
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does not directly arise under the Constitution or federal law, the
United States has the power to provide jurisdiction for all cases involving its "agents and instrumentalities."16' 8
To address the first argument we must examine the most expansive interpretation of "arising under" jurisdiction by the Supreme
Court to date: Osborn v. Bank of the United States.'6 9 The second
argument relies on the modern theory of "protective jurisdiction"
and will be addressed subsequently.
A.

Osborn v. Bank of the United States

The quintessential formulation of the breadth of article III jurisdiction was set forth in Osborn v. Bank of the United States. The
Court stated that jurisdiction exists where "the title or right set up
by the party, may be defeated by one construction of the Constitution
or law of the United States, and sustained by the opposite construction."' 70 Under that test, removal without a federal defense would be
unconstitutional because by definition the rights of the federal official
would not depend upon a construction of the Constitution or federal
law.
But Osborn has also been read as holding that jurisdiction exists
whenever the case presents a potential federal issue.' However, a
thorough reading of Osborn suggests that the word "potential" includes only those issues which are necessarily presented by plaintiff's
complaint.
Osborn involved a suit by the Bank of the United States against
state officials for invading the Bank and misappropriating money
from its vaults for unpaid taxes.'
The case clearly raised federal
issues, including the validity of the underlying taxes."" However,
the Court addressed the larger issue of whether the Bank could alFitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 451-53 (1852)).
168. Mesa, 813 F.2d at 968.
169. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
170. Id. at 822.
171. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 481-82 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (criticizing Osborn). Osborn has been criticized in this decade. See Note,
The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 933, 965-72 (1982) [hereinafter
Protective Jurisdiction]. The Supreme Court noted the potential breadth of Osborn while
avoiding a potential article III issue in Verlinden BY., 461 U.S. at 492-93. See infra note
197. See also Collins, The Unhappy History of Federal Question Removal, 71 IowA L. REV.
717, 746 n.157 (noting different interpretations of Osborn).
172. The tax and its collection were illegal per McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819). For a history of the case, see Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 171, at
966-67.
173. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
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ways sue in federal court by virtue of a provision of its federal charter allowing it to sue and be sued in federal court, even where no
174
federal issues were explicitly raised in a particular case.
The Court focused upon the peculiar nature of the Bank as an
instrumentality of the United States. Because it was a creature of
federal law, the validity of its acts depended upon the authority of
the Bank to act under its federal charter. An adverse party potentially could raise a federal issue by challenging the authority of the
Bank to sue; subsequent interpretation of the federal charter would
pose the federal issue. The Court stated that the case arose under
federal law because the federal authority issue "forms an original
ingredient in every cause.""5

This "original ingredient" theory must be carefully defined.
There are two types of cases which must be kept separate. First,
there are cases where the character of the action always presents
federal issues. Osborn was an example of the type of case that always presents federal issues. These issues are "potential" because
they may or may not be "raised" by one or both of the parties in the
action. Indeed, such issues may be so well-settled that it is highly
unlikely that they will be "raised" by the parties (e.g., the Bank's
174. Id. Perhaps as interesting for our purposes as the opinion itself is the brief
presented by the losing side. In response to the argument that all cases brought by the Bank
arise under federal law solely because the Bank was created by Congress, attorneys forthe
state officials pointed out the limits of that argument.
A clear distinction exists between a party and a cause; the party may originate
under a law with which the cause has no connection. A revenue officer may
commit a trespass while executing his official duties, and ifhe justifies under
the statutes of the United States, a question will arise under them, in which an
appellate jurisdiction is given to this court, to correct the errors of the state
courts. But could Congress give additional jurisdiction to the federal courts, in
all suits brought by or against revenue officers?
Id. at 814 (emphasis added).
This is the only published commentary to be found on the 1815 Act, and it clearly indicates that at least the authors of the briefs believed that Congress had only provided for removal where the officer could justify his conduct (i.e., present a federal defense) under the
revenue laws.
The briefs for the Bank of the United States are also interesting because they clearly state
that federal officials may operate in a private capacity.
Suppose an officer created by act of Congress, could not Congress confer on him
the privileges of suing and being sued, in the courts of the Union? Such an
officer has two capacities, private and official, and may be subject to different
jurisdictions, according as either is affected. But a corporation has but one capacity, and its faculties cannot be divided.
Id. at 807.
The two briefs considered together suggest that the parties never considered that Congress
could confer jurisdiction arising out of the official's private capacity.
175. Id. at 820.
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right to sue or contract). However, these issues are present at the
outset of the case because it is apparent from the facts presented in
the complaint that the rights of the parties are dependent upon the
resolution of a federal issue. If the Bank cannot sue, then the defendant prevails. The "original ingredient" test confers jurisdiction in
such cases.

176

The status of the party is only important if it by itself ensures
the existence of federal issues in every case. Osborn was a rare case
176. This holding was the point of contention between the majority and dissent in Osborn. Justice Johnson, in dissent, stated that a federal issue did not "arise" for purposes of
article III until a party "raised" the issue. Id. at 888-89. Justice Marshall decided that issues
necessarily implied by the complaint, though well-settled and not raised by either party,
presented federal issues sufficient for jurisdiction. Id. at 824-25.
Most important, neither Marshall nor Johnson argued that issues which were not necessarily implied by plaintiff's complaint, but could conceivably appear later in the action depending upon facts later presented, could serve as the foundation for article III jurisdiction. Thus
Marshall wrote:
The act itself is the first ingredient in the case-is its origin-is that from which
every other part arises. That other questions may also arise, as the execution of
the contract, or its performance, cannot change the case, or give it any other
origin than the charter of incorporation. The action still originates in, and is
sustained by, that charter.
Id. at 823. See Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 509-10 (1900) (interpreting
Osborn).
The Court in Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983), missed
this distinction in its remarks in dicta concerning Osborn. Justice Marshall, as part of his
holding in Osborn that the presence of one federal question allows jurisdiction over all questions presented in the case, stated the following:
If it be a sufficient foundation for jurisdiction, that the title or right set up by
the party may defeated by one construction of the constitution or law of the
United States, and sustained by the opposite construction, provided the facts
necessary to support the action, be made out, then all the other questions must
be decided as incidental to this, which gives that jurisdiction.
Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 822 (emphasis added). The Court in Verlinden interpreted
"may" as indicating that Marshall found article III jurisdiction whenever there
was a possibility that a federal question would be presented during the action. But Marshall in this section
of the opinion was not attempting to define when jurisdiction arose, but only ruling that a
single federal question was sufficient to provide jurisdiction over all other questions. Thus,
Marshall next stated that allowing jurisdiction to be frustrated by the presence of non-federal
questions would limit jurisdiction to "those parts of cases only which present the particular
question involving the construction of the constitution or the law." Id. (emphasis added). Marshall assumed that the core federal issue conferring jurisdiction upon all issues in the case was
presented, if not yet "raised," by plaintiff's complaint.
Moreover, the use of "may" instead of "will" appears more stylistic than substantive in
light of Marshall's phrase "provided the facts necessary to support the action be made out."
Id. That phrase implies that the federal issue is necessarily implied by the allegations made in
the complaint. The court in determining jurisdiction assumes that those allegations are true
and that the party will provide the necessary evidence later in the suit. While the factual
support for the allegations can wait, the allegations in the complaint must establish the presence of federal issues, even if the party may choose not to "raise" those issues immediately.
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because the status of the Bank as a "creature" of federal law
presented potential, if not well-settled, federal issues in every case.
In this first class of cases, the "original ingredient" must appear
from the facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint."' Allowing the
defendant to obtain jurisdiction by asserting that the type of action
indicates that one party may later in the action present facts raising
federal issues (also "potential" issues, but in the sense that these issues might, or might not, develop later in the action), would create
unlimited jurisdiction. For example, a defendant in a criminal prosecution might simply assert that he is black, and argue that it is conceivable that he might later raise a federal issue by 8claiming racial
17
discrimination in violation of the 14th amendment.
The second class of cases encompasses suits where the facts
stated in the complaint do not automatically present federal issues.
Such a case can "arise under" article III only if a party raises a
federal issue that is dispositive of that lawsuit. In the absence of an
"original ingredient," a party may not create jurisdiction merely by
stating a set of facts from which a federal issue might arise upon the
development of other facts. Because there are no federal issues inherent in the character of the action, jurisdiction does not exist unless
and until other federal issues are "raised" which are dispositive of
177. Id. at 824.
178. But what about suits against federally chartered corporations? Osborn held that
the Bank of the United States may sue as plaintiff in federal court. Does the character of the
federal corporate defendant also automatically raise federal issues sufficient for jurisdiction
even though the plaintiff's capacity to sue or act is not a federal question? The Supreme Court
has held that this flip side of the coin is governed by Osborn. See Union Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Myers, 115 U.S. 1, 11 (1885). The rationale is that the mere suit against such an entity
ensures that its conduct is at issue. As a creature of federal law entirely dependent upon federal authority, those acts will require construction of the corporation's federal charter.
But such inherent issues must still arise from plaintiff's complaint. It is the plaintiff's
required allegation of defendant's status that confers jurisdiction because it automatically raises
federal issues. Thus, the Court has held that plaintiff cannot avoid those inherent issues by
omitting the allegation of defendant's federal status from the complaint. See Texas & P.R. Co.
v. Cody, 166 U.S. 606, 609-10 (1896).
The prosecution is under no obligation to allege a defendant's federal status. Federal
official defendants must raise relevant defenses (the "construction" test) in order to obtain
jurisdiction.
Of course, the extension of the flimsy Osborn "original ingredient" test to cases filed
against federal corporations (or officials) is particularly problematic because most such cases
will not involve the authority of the corporation to act (e.g., tort cases).
Finally, the Union Pacific case has been characterized as an incorrect decision by the
Court, largely because the federally chartered corporations of that time had lost the federal
character imbued by the United States Bank; they were basically private entities. See Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (stating
that the decision was considered by many to be a "sport"); Collins, supra note 171, at 746-48,
766.
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the particular case. 79
In the typical criminal case, the federal official's status would
not be an "original ingredient" of the prosecution. The plaintiff's
case in the criminal prosecution would require only a prima facie
showing that the official committed an unlawful act with criminal
intent. The prosecution would not be required to allege that defendant is a federal official. The prosecution could prevail without first
proving that the official did not act in enforcement of federal law,
just as plaintiff in an ordinary contract action need not show that his
contract is unaffected by federal law. An allegation of necessity or
privilege is an affirmative defense, 80 and in the absence of a federal
defense, there would be no direct assertion of a federal issue.
Furthermore, while the Bank's status created an actual federal
issue in Osborn, defendants' status as federal employees would not
do so here. Federal employees are not "creatures of federal law," 18 '
and the fact that they are employed by the United States when they
commit a charged act does not create a federal issue."8 '
But even if the status of the official as employed by the United
179. See Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 203 (1877). The Court in
that case construed Osborn as preventing removal under the admittedly narrower general federal question statute where a federal question might be presented only at a later point in the
litigation.
180. For example, federal officials seeking a writ of habeas corpus have the burden of
showing that they acted pursuant to federal authority. See Morgan v. California, 743 F.2d
728, 731 (9th Cir. 1984).
181. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824).
182. Justice Marshall recognized that the mere status of the Bank as an entity created
by the United States could not by itself create federal jurisdiction.
It is said that a clear distinction exists between the party and the cause; that the
party may originate under a law with which the cause has no connection; and
that Congress may, with the same propriety, give a naturalized citizen, who is
the mere creature of a law, a right to sue in the courts of the United States, as
give that right to the bank.
This distinction is not denied; and, if the act of Congress was a simple act
of incorporation, and contained nothing more, it might be entitled to great consideration. But the act does not stop with incorporating the bank. It proceeds to
bestow upon the being it has made all the faculties and capacities which that
being possesses. Every act of the bank grows out of this law, and is tested by it.
To use the language of the constitution, every act of the bank arises out of this
law.
Id. at 826-27. Justice Marshall's concession was prompted by the dissent's argument that
focusing upon the identity of the party instead of the issues raised by the case would create
jurisdiction for any case involving federal officials. Id. at 901-02 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall did not rely upon the status of the Bank to create jurisdiction directly, but
upon the fact that the Bank's status created federal questions concerning all of its acts, including its right to sue. Thus, the official's employment by a federal entity, without more, cannot
serve as the basis for article III jurisdiction. Otherwise, article III jurisdiction would extend to
all suits by federal employees arising out of off-duty activities.
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States is not an "original ingredient," could the fact that the official
was performing his federal duties when he committed the charged
act provide a nexus with the federal government and federal laws
sufficient to invoke the Supremacy Clause? No, because the typical
criminal case does not fall into either of the two classes of cases set
forth in Osborn. As noted above, the fact that the official was on
duty is not an "original ingredient" of the prosecution's case. 8 '
Since there is no "original ingredient" present, this case falls into the
second category of cases discussed above. Federal jurisdiction exists
only after the official raises a dispositive federal issue. The mere allegation that the official was on duty does not necessarily present a
Supremacy Clause issue.
The Supremacy Clause insulates the acts of the United States
from state prosecution. By extension, it protects acts of others, such
as federal agencies, which are in behalf of the United States. But a
federal official is fundamentally different from a federal agency. The
federal official is not an inseparable part of the United States; he can
act in both a private and official capacity. The problem with the
argument that the official's performance of federal duties provides
jurisdiction is that actions of an official while on duty are not necessarily (or, in a typical criminal case, even probably) actions taken in
reliance upon the laws authorizing his duties. Thus, merely alleging
that the official was on duty fails to allege that he committed the
charged act in his official capacity and accordingly fails to demonstrate the existence of an "arising under" federal issue.
The dividing line between private and official acts is not
whether the official was being paid by the United States when he
acted, or even whether he was performing official duties at the time
he committed the charged act. The issue is whether the official committed the charged act on behalf of the United States by enforcing or
complying with federal law.
The distinction may not be obvious. Suppose that a mail carrier
is on his lunch hour, although he is still being paid a salary by the
United States for the entire day. While driving to begin his afternoon
route, he deliberately runs over a pedestrian. There is no nexus be183. See, e.g., Martin v. Wyzanski, 262 F. Supp. 925 (D. Mass. 1967). Plaintiff in
Wyzanski sued a federal judge for libel after that judge wrote a negative letter about him. The
court granted the judge's motion for dismissal for want of federal jurisdiction. The court held
that the judge's status and potential official immunity defense alone could not create federal
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because of the "well-pleaded complaint" rule. Id. at 927.
Although section 1331 is construed more narrowly than article III, the logic of the decision
should apply to both provisions.

1989]

REMOVAL OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS

tween the Supremacy Clause and the official's on-duty status. Hitting a pedestrian is not an act in official character. The official has
committed a private act outside his duty to carry the mail for the
United States. Taking the mail carrier out of his lunch hour and
placing him on duty delivering mail does not change the analysis.
The carrier has still removed himself from his official capacity and
his "scope of employment" by committing an unauthorized act not
required to deliver the mail.""' The fact that he was on duty does not
184. To argue that article III jurisdiction encompasses such acts because they were committed "within the scope of his employment" begs the question. See, e.g., California v. Mesa,
813 F.2d 960, 968 (9th Cir. 1987) (Noonan, J., dissenting). Assume that a mail carrier drives
his truck down the sidewalk, running over pedestrians. The mail carrier's actions other than
the charged act may have been committed within the scope of his employment. But the issue of
whether his hitting a pedestrian was within the scope of employment for purposes of a criminal action is an issue to be raised via a federal defense, and only then is it decided.
In Mesa, simply stating that hitting a bicyclist (or a police car) was an act committed
within the "scope of employment" did not put the laws authorizing those duties into issue. The
official certainly did not contend that those laws authorized his allegedly negligent driving.
Rather, he alleged that the accident occurred while he was on duty and acting in the course
and scope of his employment. Stating that the alleged criminal act occurred while he was
discharging his duty did not present a federal issue because it said nothing about why the
charged act was committed; he stated only that he was doing other proper things when the
incident occurred. "Scope of employment" in practice means nothing more than that the official was on duty.
The phrase "scope of employment" appears to have been borrowed from official immunity cases, where the official may assert a federal defense in a civil suit by showing that he had
the discretion to commit the act by virtue of his federal authority. See Westfall v. Erwin, 108
S. Ct. 580 (1988). But facts which raise federal issues in such cases do not necessarily raise
them in criminal actions. A simple statement that the official was on duty in a typical civil case
may well raise a federal issue sufficient for removal because it actually alleges a federal defense. See Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 409 (1969). But the same statement in.Mesa
did not raise a federal issue because the official immunity doctrine does not apply to criminal
cases. The related doctrine of federal immunity requires the official to demonstrate that his
acts were necessary and proper to the exercise of his federal authority. See In re Neagle, 135
U.S. 1 (1890). The official does not assert that defense merely by claiming that he was on duty
at all times.
Finally, defining "scope of employment" invites difficulties. The presumption is that certain acts are not within the "scope of employment" because they are inherently reckless or
apart from the mandated duties ("on a frolic of his own"), and that all other activities performed while on duty are covered. However, the determination of the underlying facts (i.e.,
was the mailman driving 25 mph or 100 mph; was he intoxicated?) will often comprise the
case to be decided. The gravamen of the criminal action is that the official acted in a criminal
manner. The criminal complaint will often provide no facts except to identify the charges filed.
Thus, the determination of whether the official acted within the "scope of employment" would
be based upon the official's allegations. Those allegations will always indicate that the official
was acting within the scope of employment. The "scope of employment" test would be reduced
to a declaration that the official was on duty at the time the incident occurred. The federal
official fails to make the connection between the laws authorizing his duties and the charged
act. He only tells us what he was supposed to be doing, but not what he actually did. Only the
federal defense requirement forms the proper boundary for article III jurisdiction because the
assertion of the defense actually presents federal issues.
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change the character of the alleged act.
The focus must instead be on whether the carrier relies upon
the laws authorizing his duties to justify the collision. If he fails to
do so, then the issue of whether he acted in an official capacity is not
in dispute, and there is no nexus between the prosecution and the
Supremacy Clause sufficient to make the case "arise under" the
Constitution. A case cannot "arise under" a law that is irrelevant to
the disposition of the action. The official must supply the nexus in
each case by alleging a federal defense bringing his "official character" into issue.' 86
B.

ProtectiveJurisdiction

We have seen that prosecutions of federal officials in the absence of a federal defense do not "arise under" article III under the
traditional analysis of that provision. However, scholars have suggested that Congress may grant federal jurisdiction over cases involving no federal issues where there is a "substantial Article I interest."' ' This theory of "protective jurisdiction" asserts that a case
"arises under" article III when Congress grants jurisdiction to advance an article I interest. Adherents suggest that Congress must be
able to provide a federal forum when it is necessary to the execution
of its article I powers.
There appear to be two "types" of protective jurisdiction, each
asserting a different source of congressional power to confer jurisdiction in the absence of a federal issue. The first theory suggests that
Congress may provide jurisdiction over any case where it has the
185. This is even more compelling where, as here, the defendant official has the opportunity to choose his own facts. He may choose to create a federal issue by alleging a federal
defense. What he cannot do is allege only those facts sufficient to suggest a mere possibility of
a federal issue when he knows whether facts actually creating that issue exist. This type of
selective factual allegation was the impetus behind the Supreme Court's strict "causal connection" test in Soper (No. 1). Thus, the official may not allege that he was on duty when he hit
the pedestrian (which raises the faint possibility that he may have relied upon federal law
when he committed the charged act), but fail to state whether he in fact relied upon federal
law in doing so. Justice Frankfurter argued in his dissent in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 481-82 (1957), that federal jurisdiction should not extend to "potential" federal issues. Rather, Congress could and should provide removal jurisdiction to defendants raising concrete federal issues. Id. at 477-79 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Otherwise, Congress could mandate federal jurisdiction for cases involving any federal
official because it is possible that the official was enforcing federal law when he committed the
charged acts. Off-duty acts could be removed under such a standard. In addition, off-duty
officials might seek removal because of "the potential" that subsequent facts would indicate
that their prosecution was motivated by animus toward federal officials.
186. See Protective Jurisdiction,supra note 171, at 959.
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power under article I to enact laws governing the outcome of that
case. 1 7 This theory is generally associated with the term "protective
jurisdiction." The second theory abstains from relying on the power
to create substantive law in favor of a less concrete ground: the
power of Congress to create a federal forum to protect federal "interests."' 8 8 Whatever the merits of either form of "protective jurisdiction" generally, both theories fail to justify federal jurisdiction over
criminal prosecutions against federal officials in the absence of a federal defense.
1. Jurisdiction Based Upon the Power of Congress to Enact
Substantive Law
Professor Wechsler neatly states the contours of the first theory
when he explains that jurisdiction extends to "all cases in which
Congress has the authority to make the rule to govern disposition of
the controversy, but is content instead to let the states provide the
rule so long as jurisdiction to enforce it has been vested in federal
court." '89 This theory has been criticized by the Supreme Court because it is a principle without limitation. Thus, Justice Frankfurter
opined in Lincoln Mills,' 90 that "every contract or tort arising out of
a contract affecting commerce might be a potential cause of action in
the federal courts, even though only state law was involved in the
decision of the case."'' More recently, the Court in Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,"9" criticized a similar formulation of the theory. Respondents in Northern Pipeline sought to justify adjudication of bankruptcy cases by article I courts by
contending that Congress may delegate article III matters to article I
courts where Congress has the power under article I to create the
laws adjudicated by those courts. 9 The Court rejected this rationale
187. See Wechsler, supra note 74, at 224-25.
188. See Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 171, at 961.
189. See Wechsler, supra note 74, at 224; Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 171, at
960.
190. 353 U.S. 448, 474 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
191. Id.Frankfurter's comments on forum-based jurisdiction are discussed infra note
199.
192. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
193. Id. at 72-73. This formulation is actually narrower than Professor Wechsler's theory in that it already assumes that the controversies fit within article III. The formulation
seeks only to allow different federal courts to adjudicate article III cases. Professor Wechsler
attempts to bootstrap non-federal cases into article III controversies based upon Congress'
unexercised power to bring such controversies within article III.
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because "it provides no limiting principle." ' '
Furthermore, this theory may be irrelevant because there does
not appear to be any article I power justifying such regulation of
state criminal law in the absence of an attack upon federal law or
authority. Congress cannot provide federal rules of decision for litigating traffic tickets outside of the rights afforded by the Constitution,195 and the mere prosecution of a traffic ticket does not invoke
those rights.
194. Id. at 73.
195. There is currently no federal common law governing prosecution of federal officials. Congress could certainly enact laws preventing the harassment of officials, or the conviction of such officials asserting federal defenses. However, it seems unlikely that Congress has
the power under article I to enact special federal criminal laws governing the prosecution of
ordinary traffic citations even under the necessary and proper clause because there does not
appear to be an enumerated power available to justify such a law.
The two article I powers interpreted most expansively, the power to tax and to regulate
commerce, appear to bear little relationship to prescription of substantive rules governing trials
of all federal officials for acts committed while on the job, but unconnected with federal authority. Commerce is unaffected by prosecutions of federal officials for acts unconnected with
federal authority. That a mail carrier is incarcerated because he hit a pedestrian while on
duty, rather than while on vacation, does not affect commerce. Similarly, the United States fisc
is not affected by trying federal officials in state courts, since a guilty verdict may not collaterally estop the United States in a subsequent action. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S.
154 (1984) (United States cannot be the subject of offensive collateral estoppel even when it
was a party in the previous action). It is not surprising, then, that the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the earlier removal statutes because they allowed federal officials to
litigate federal defenses in federal court. See Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1880);
The Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 254 (1867). But the Supremacy Clause only
prevents states from convicting officials for conduct justified under federal law.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressed doubt that Congress can enact laws prohibiting
states from hindering mail delivery by arresting on-duty mail carriers on pre-existing warrants. The Court in United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482 (1868), held that a federal law
preventing detention of persons carrying the mails did not apply to state officials who had
arrested a mail carrier on a felony warrant. The Court expressed doubt that such a law invading state sovereignty would be constitutional. Id. at 486. The law in Kirby at least might be
justified by Congress' interest in ensuring that the delivery of mail, a federal function guaranteed by the article I postal power (U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 7) was not interfered with by
state officials. However, the trial of a mail carrier does not directly interfere with mail delivery, just as the trial of any other federal official does not directly obstruct that official's activities. It is difficult to believe that the Framers were willing to allow the federal government to
invade state sovereignty under such circumstances. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 474 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 189 (1953) (suggesting that Congress
might not have had the power to enact laws governing all transactions of the Bank of the
United States; it follows that Congress does not have the power to regulate all lawsuits arising
from the acts of federal officials committed in their private capacity). Adherents to this theory
indicate that Congress provides jurisdiction by moving to protect its regulation of an area or a
national policy; neither exists with regard to federal officials acting in their private capacity
while on duty.
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2. Jurisdiction Based on the Power of Congress to Create a
Federal Forum
Other scholars do not believe that the power of Congress to confer jurisdiction depends upon its power to enact substantive law.
Rather, these theorists argue that Congress has the power to create a
federal forum to protect "federal interests." They assert that Congress has the power to enact laws to protect federal interests from
discrimination even in the absence of federal laws or regulation in a
particular area.196
There are several problems with this idea. First, the Supreme
Court appeared to disagree with this principle in Verlinden B.V. v.
State Bank of Nigeria."" The Court noted that a purely jurisdictional statute could not serve as the federal statute under which the
cases arise. 9 However, since "forum-based" jurisdiction is based
upon a "federal interest" and not an actual federal statute, the only
federal law available for the cases to "arise under" is the jurisdictional statute.
Second, "forum-based" jurisdiction stretches the "arising
under" language of article III past the breaking point. Such cases
would not arise under "the law and Constitution," but under "federal interests." "The law and Constitution" is clearly definable;
"federal interests" are whatever Congress or the courts say they are
at a particular time.
This new source of power also imperils federalism by severing
196. See Protective Jurisdiction,supra note 171, at 963-64 (summarizing views of other
scholars). This Note proposes a more conservative version of "forum-based" jurisdiction requiring that Congress have a "substantial" interest in removing the subject-matter from state
jurisdiction.
[T]he jurisdictional grant must not be broader than the forum-based interest
warrants. The necessity of enforcing labor agreements in federal court, for example, could not support a grant of jurisdiction over all contract disputes affecting commerce. It is the prohibition against overbreadth that prevents the forumbased model of protective jurisdiction advanced in this Note from engulfing the
remaining heads of article III jurisdiction.
Protective Jurisdiction,supra note 171, at 959. This prohibition should extend to cases lacking a federal defense. Other commentators have suggested that only a "necessary and proper"
standard might be used, which really means that "anything goes." See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN,
D. SHAPIRO, & H. WESCHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 416, § (2)(d) (2d ed. 1973).
197. 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
198. The Court held that cases could arise under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976), because that Act was not a purely jurisdictional statute, but
prescribed substantive federal rules governing suits against other nations. Verlinden B.V., 461
U.S. at 495-97. See California v. Mesa, 57 U.S.L.W. 4199 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1989) (No. 871206).
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the connection between the existence of relevant federal law and jurisdiction. Under "forum-based" jurisdiction, Congress need not
have the power to enact a federal law regulating an area in order to
provide jurisdiction over cases arising out of that area. Instead, Congress could provide for federal adjudication of issues based upon a
"federal interest" in their resolution. But the Constitution defines the
limits of such "federal interests;" if Congress cannot enact a law or
legislative scheme to protect such interests, perhaps those interests
should not be protected.
Federal instrumentalities are a good example. Scholars point to
Osborn as an example of a decision that can only be justified by a
"forum-based" jurisdiction depending upon the congressional "interest" in preventing state discrimination against its instrumentalities.199 The problem is that this principle creates a "slippery slope."
199. See Protective Jurisdiction,supra note 171, at 972. Professor Mishkin has flatly
stated that article III jurisdiction encompasses cases involving the United States, its agents, and
its instrumentalities. Mishkin, supra note 195, at 193. However, the passage containing that
statement indicates that Mishkin used "agents" to refer to government agencies. Mishkin,
supra note 195, at 193.
Furthermore, suits against the government (or its agencies) are different from suits
against federal officials. Clearly, Mishkin is correct when he states that jurisdiction exists in
cases involving the United States, as any case involving the activities of the United States tests
the authority of the United States to act under federal law; that question is an "original ingredient" of the lawsuit. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
Of course, Osborn also settles the instrumentality issue, albeit in an unsatisfactory manner.
But criminal prosecutions against federal officials do not involve the United States or the
Supremacy Clause in the absence of a federal defense.
While on the subject of discomforting pronouncements, we must take up Justice Frankfurter's discussion of section 1442(a). See Textile, 353 U.S. at 475 n.5 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Frankfurter criticized "protective jurisdiction" as providing for jurisdiction based
upon distrust of state courts in construing state law. His argument was that the limits of such
distrust had to be the Constitution as expressed by article III (i.e., diversity jurisdiction).
For some inexplicable reason, Frankfurter felt obliged to account for section 1442(a)(1),
even though, as discussed above, that section was intended to prevent adjudication of federal
law, as opposed to biased tribunals in cases wholly under state law. He first properly distinguished the removal statute by finding that the statute had been interpreted as requiring a
federal defense. Id. ("that put federal law in the forefront as a defense") (interpreting Davis,
100 U.S. 257 (1880)).
Unfortunately, Frankfurter also felt obliged to provide an alternate, and incorrect,
rationale:
In any event, the fact that officers of the Federal Government were parties may
be considered sufficient to afford access to the federal forum. [citations omitted).
"Without doubt, a federal forum should be available for all suits involving the
Government, its agents and instrumentalities, regardless of the source of the
substantive rule."
Mishkin, supra note 195, at 193 (emphasis added).
First, the use of the word "may" suggests that Frankfurter had some doubts about this
pronouncement. Second, he appears to have misinterpreted Mishkin's statement to refer to
federal officials instead of government agencies. Or, like Mishkin, Frankfurter may have as-
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It assumes that state courts might discriminate against certain quasigovernmental entities. However, if we assume that state courts might
not fairly treat entities connected with the federal government in the
civil arena, we must assume that private contractors working for the
federal government might also be discriminated against. Should we
allow Congress to confer federal jurisdiction for all suits involving
any person performing services for the federal government, where
the charged act occurred while on the job but is otherwise unconnected with federal law? Where should we draw the line?
The problem is more severe when we turn to federal officials.
At least government instrumentalities are products of federal law,
and we can be confident that such instrumentalities will generally act
on behalf of and as an agent for the United States. We cannot be as
confident regarding federal officials, who commit negligent or intentional acts apart from their official character even while on duty.
Thus, even if "forum-based" jurisdiction has any viability, the line
must be drawn to include instrumentalities, but to exclude federal
officials.200
Furthermore, although Congress may have an interest in protecting federal officials from hostile state courts in actions where no
federal defense is presented, 2"' how far does that interest extend?
sumed that federal officials would be acting in their official capacities when suing or being
sued. He appears not to have considered the possibility that the official might have been on
duty but acting in a private capacity (i.e., without a federal defense). Thus, his only support
for that statement (aside from Mishkin) was In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895), which held that
Congress could apply to the courts for an injunction against activities interfering with its article I powers over interstate commerce.
Of course, the United States must have access to a federal forum to exercise its constitutional powers; such cases arise under the Constitution. But Debs does not speak to instrumentalities or federal officials acting in a private capacity. And federal officials really are not
"agents" when they so act. Debs really only stands for the proposition that federal jurisdiction
is coextensive with the Supremacy Clause, which is also the appropriate interpretation of section 1442(a).
To the extent that Frankfurter meant to refer to all officials who committed private acts
while on duty, he is bereft of support and this author respectfully disagrees with his footnote.
200. This author does not reach a conclusion as to whether article III affords federal
jurisdiction to instrumentalities, as it is enough for our purposes that federal officials clearly
should not be allowed such jurisdiction in the absence of a federal defense that clearly implicates such interests. However, at least one commentator illustrates the perils of "forum-based"
jurisdiction when he states that the interests of the federal government may have changed
enough over time that federal jurisdiction over instrumentalities is no longer necessary and
thus perhaps no longer available. See Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 171, at 974.
201. However, it should be noted that Congress waited until 1961 to enact the Federal
Driver's Act. See supra note 75. Before the Act, federal drivers could be sued in state court
despite their having committed the charged act while on duty. See supra note 75. That Act
only covers federal drivers; other federal employees still may be sued in state courts. Thus,
Congress certainly has not felt a compelling need to protect federal officials from hostile state

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

Should we allow federal jurisdiction when a federal official is sued
by his neighbor for taking his neighbor's lawn mower and not returning it? Should it matter that the federal official ostensibly was
delivering mail to his neighbor when he took the lawn mower?
There are no reasonable guidelines for evaluating the potential for
state prejudice, and no realistic means of eliminating it wholesale
without federalizing our judicial system and creating a protected
class of federal officials. Of course, since "forum-based" jurisdiction
depends upon a basis for congressional concern over prejudice
against "federal interests," it should also be relevant that there is
currently no evidence of such prejudice in the United States today.
In sum, even if we acknowledge the legitimacy of protective jurisdiction,2" 2 that theory has limits. Trying to create federal jurisdiction for all persons connected with the United States who may be the
subject of state enmity is unworkable. But the United States can create jurisdiction for itself, and the United States is able to undertake
activities which encounter state opposition. And where an official
acts on behalf of the United States and has a federal defense, federal
jurisdiction is available. The Supremacy Clause also provides jurisdiction where a state harasses a federal official undertaking such activities. Thus, the operations of the federal government are adequately protected within the current boundaries of article III
jurisdiction as expressed by the federal defense requirement. Protective jurisdiction for federal employees is thus unnecessary.
V.

HABEAS CORPUS IS THE PROPER REMEDY FOR HARASSMENT

There are major differences between the writ of habeas
corpus2"' and removal. 20 ' The writ is collateral to trial. The writ
courts.
202. Some commentators have suggested that protective jurisdiction must exist because it
provides the only basis for the right of a trustee in bankruptcy to sue in federal court on
wholly state causes of action. See Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 171, at Appendix A.
However, there are three plausible explanations for such jurisdiction. First, the trustee
presents federal issues under Osborn every time it sues in federal court as an instrumentality
of the United States. This is particularly true with the introduction of United States Trustees
in 1989. See 28 U.S.C. 581 (1982). The trustee will be nonsuited if it does not enjoy the right
to sue on behalf of the United States.
Second, the Bankruptcy Code is not merely a jurisdictional statute. State causes of action
tried in federal court are subject to the procedural and substantive restrictions of the Code.
Thus, as with the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1982), the Code
provides jurisdiction for state causes of action. See Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. 480 (1983). Finally, the federal court enjoys pendant jurisdiction over the state causes of action, as those
claims will affect the estate over which the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction.
203. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(2), (3) (1982).
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requires the state to justify its detention of the official, and the district court decides whether the state's showing indicates that the official is held in violation of federal law or the Constitution.20 5 If the
state prevails, the official must stand trial in state court. If the detention is found unlawful, the official is discharged."' Unlike removal,
only one hearing is held upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
A. A Brief History of the Writ Indicates That Congress Intended
It to be Used to Resolve Harassment Claims
Although the writ of habeas corpus ("the writ") is as old as
English common law, its introduction into American law was gradual. The writ provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not apply
to prisoners held in state courts.10 7 The writ was expanded when the
federal official removal statute was reenacted as part of the 1833
Act.20 8 Along with the remainder of the Act, it applied to prisoners
confined in state facilities. The writ could be issued "for any act
done, or omitted to be done, in pursuance of a law of the United
States, or any order, process, or decree, of any judge or court. ' 29
The next expansion occurred in 1842 and allowed prisoners to
apply for the writ on the ground that their actions were justified
204. A third alternative, rarely employed, is a declaratory judgment action to enjoin
prosecution. See Baucom v. Martin, 677 F.2d 1346, 1349, 1350 (11 th Cir. 1982). Such cases
generally litigate the federal immunity defense, discussed infra note 215. The procedure
should be similar to habeas corpus, except that a finding of immunity leads to an injunction
instead of discharge.
205. The abstention doctrine, requiring petitioners to exhaust state remedies before filing a writ, does not prevent federal officials from proceeding directly to federal court. The
possible restraint on the federal government mandates immediate review. See United States ex
rel. Drury v. Lewis, 200 U.S. 1 (1906); Morgan v. California, 743 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1984).
206. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
207. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 82. See also Amsterdam, supra
note 52, at 806 n.54. Professor Amsterdam presents an excellent history of the writ, as did the
Court in Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
208. Act of March 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 632, 634.
209. Id. Note that this provision, like the removal provisions of the same statute, focused
upon the act of the individual in enforcing or complying with federal law. The statute was not
limited to federal officials, indicating that Congress was interested in the act, and not the actor.
It appears that Congress was only interested in protecting persons who attempted to enforce
the revenue laws.
This statute protected officers and other persons executing court orders. It is possible that
Congress added this remedy to avoid confusion over whether an official executing a court order
based upon the revenue laws was entitled to removal. This problem did emerge later with the
removal statute. See supra text accompanying notes 64-71. But there is nothing in the legislative history suggesting that Congress intended either remedy to encompass cases unrelated to
federal law.
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under the Law of Nations.2 " Again, the focus was not on the status
of the actor, but on the character of his defense. The writ was further expanded to its present dimensions in 1867; it now applies to
cases where the prisoner is held "in violation of the Constitution, or
of any treaty for law of the United States. ' 21 ' The writ is clearly
based upon the character of the prisoner's claim.
While Congress crafted the removal statute as a limited jurisdictional device to transfer federal questions to federal courts, the
expansion of the writ in 1867 was intended to extend habeas corpus
jurisdiction to its constitutional limits. 2

2

This suggests that while

Congress did not intend the removal statute to encompass all forms
of harassment, 1 3 it was concerned about harassment. Congress intended the writ of habeas corpus to be available as a remedy against
harassment against federal employees, since such harassment implicates the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.21 4
B. The Writ Still Provides an Alternative Procedurefor Asserting
a Federal Defense
Before turning to the recent employment of the writ against
harassment, it should be noted that the writ may be used to assert a
federal defense. The official may seek discharge by a federal judge on
the grounds that his acts were necessary to performance of his federally mandated duties. To obtain discharge on the writ, the federal
official must prove that he acted in pursuit of federal law. However,
the official loses the benefit of the reasonable doubt standard; the
210. Act of August 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539; Neagle, 135 U.S. at 2.
211. Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1958)).
212. See Ex Parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325-26 (1867). The legislative
history of the 1867 Act suggests that it was aimed at all forms of harassment of federal officials
and those who sided with them during the Civil War. Although the 1863 and 1866 removal
statutes share similar roots, they tracked the language, and retained the limited jurisdiction of,
their forebearers, the 1815 and 1833 Acts. Indeed, the 1867 habeas corpus statute has been
described as a tougher response to state evasion of the removal statutes (including those copied
into the 1866 Civil Rights Act, Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27). See also
Amsterdam, supra note 52, at 885 n.385.
213. See Maryland v. Soper (No. 2), 270 U.S. 36 (1926).
214. The original provisions of the 1833 Act remain as section 2241(c)(2). The language of that section tracks the removal statute included in that Act, suggesting that Congress
did not intend that section to be construed more broadly than the removal provision. Thus,
there may be reason to interpret section (c)(3) more broadly than (c)(2). However, both sections have been used interchangeably as grounds for discharge by federal officials. Compare
Morgan v. California, 743 F.2d 728, 731 (9th Cir. 1984) and Clifton v. Cox, 549 F.2d 722,
725 (9th Cir. 1977) (both cases citing (c)(2)), with, Neagle, 135 U.S. at 19 (relying upon
(c)(3), but citing earlier cases brought under (c)(2)).
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facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution.'"
215. It must be clear after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state
that the official acted within the scope of his federal authority and that his actions were necessary and proper to carry out that authority. Gay v. Ruff, 292 U.S. 25, 31 n.23 (1934). Morgan, 743 F.2d at 733. The issue of the official's authority is a question of law to be decided by
the district court. A different standard exists for claims of harassment. See infra text accompanying note 220. However, this two-pronged test has been interpreted very broadly to include
cases where the federal official's conduct was not within his authority. Every court that has
recently considered the question has held that the federal immunity defense protects federal
officials who have a good faith and reasonable belief that their actions were within their authority. See Kentucky v. Long, 837 F.2d 727, 752 (6th Cir. 1988) (collected cases) (holding
that summary judgment was appropriate in removed criminal case; official must have reasonably thought at the time that their acts were necessary and justified); Baucom v. Martin, 677
F.2d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1982); Morgan, 743 F.2d at 733 (citing Clifton v. Cox, 549 F.2d
722, 730 (9th Cir. 1977)).
Some courts have even dropped the requirement that the action actually have been reasonable at the time it was taken (as opposed to reasonable in hindsight), so long as the official
acted in good faith. One court has analogized federal immunity to official immunity, suggesting
that the non-malicious exercise of authority, even if beyond the bounds of federal law and
reasonableness, is grounds for discharge because it negates any possibility of criminal intent.
See Clifton, 549 F.2d at 726-27 and cases collected therein. Morgan, 743 F.2d 728 (9th Cir.
1984) (following Clifton).
The rationale has been that the Supremacy Clause prohibits states from punishing officials criminally for their mistakes. If the official did not possess criminal intent, then he cannot
be guilty of a crime under state law because he was merely attempting to perform his duties. If
he cannot be guilty under state law, then he certainly cannot be guilty under federal law.
Assuming that honest belief is a defense, then the federal courts must decide whether the
defense has been made in a particular case.
But there are no Supreme Court cases holding that the Supremacy Clause shields an
official from a good faith act in excess of his authority under federal law. Although the recent
cases rely upon Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890), the Court in Neagle only found that the officer
acted within his authority. The only other Supreme Court case on this point was decided over
eighty years ago. The Court denied relief because of conflicting evidence as to whether the
officer acted in excess of his federal authority without considering whether it could be inferred
from the undisputed evidence that the official had acted in good faith. See United States ex rel.
Drury v. Lewis, 200 U.S. 1, 5 (1906). See also Clifton, 549 F.2d at 731 (Merrill, J.,
dissenting).
Although the federal immunity defense is closely linked to the official immunity defense,
there are few similarities. The official immunity defense protects the discretion to exercise
authority; acts outside of that authority are not protected. If the analogy is pursued, a good
faith mistake would not be a defense. But see Clifton, id. However, there is considerable force
to the argument that federalism demands that the federal government, not the states, punish
errant federal officers for their mistakes. If that is so, then allowing the states to decide when
mistakes of judgment were made defeats that purpose.
This author merely poses the issue without making the sizable digression away from our
topic necessary to offer even a tentative resolution. However, the issue is almost completely
moot, because the issue of good faith, and thus criminal intent, is virtually always an issue
where the federal official claims an attempt to follow federal law. Although the issue can be
posed as whether states should be allowed to decide whether federal officials who have exceeded their authority intended to do so, section 1442(a)(1) in practice grants federal jurisdiction to officials who can colorably allege that they acted within the confines of federal law. In
addition to their federal defense, their state-law defenses (i.e., lack of intent) are also tried in
federal court. Considerations of judicial economy suggest that the federal official make his
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Although this last feature makes the writ a less favorable remedy in
most cases, the writ was the only remedy available for most federal
officials until the removal statute was extended in 1948.
C. Recent Cases Suggest That Habeas Corpus Is an Appropriate
Remedy for Harassment
The habeas corpus statute encompasses all cases where the federal official is confined in violation of the Constitution.2 1 The
Supremacy Clause prohibits the malicious prosecution of federal officials based upon their status. It should be irrelevant whether the animus toward the official is based upon past acts in enforcement of
federal law, current enforcement, or merely prejudice against the
federal government generally.
The Ninth Circuit has recently recognized that the writ may
issue to prevent malicious prosecution. In Morgan v. California,1
the court noted that the traditional reticence of federal courts to invade the province of state jurisdiction over criminal matters does not
apply where the prosecution is motivated by an intent to frustrate
the enforcement of federal law. 1 8 It is a small step from that principle to the conclusion that any prosecution against a federal official
motivated by animus toward the federal government is also motivated by animus toward the enforcement of federal law.
The Ninth Circuit was not clear about how such claims were to
be evaluated, stating only that discharge would be appropriate "[i]f,
after holding an evidentiary hearing, it is apparent to the district
judge that the state criminal prosecution was so intended, the writ
should be granted even if the judge has to resolve factual disputes to
arrive at that conclusion." '19 The burden of proof should be on the
federal official, although exactly what standard should be applied is
unclear.22 0 More important than the allocation of the burden of
defense of good faith in the habeas corpus proceeding, rather than allowing his petition to be
denied and reconsidered with the entire case at trial.
Furthermore, this issue does not affect the usual case of negligence because in those cases
the official cannot allege that the charged acts were the result of his attempt to enforce federal
law through exercise of his official authority.
216. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1976).
217. 743 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1984).
218. Id. at 733 (finding no improper motive in that case).
219. Id.
220. The Ninth Circuit merely stated that the district court has the power to discharge
the official if "it is shown that the state criminal prosecution is intended to frustrate the enforcement of federal law." Id. However, that language implies that the burden of proof is on
the official.

1989]

REMOVAL OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS

proof is the fact that the writ provides a separate proceeding for
" '
challenging harassment.22
D. Resolving Harassment Claims By Writ of Habeas Corpus
Instead of Removal Still Protects Federal Employees
This article has argued that Congress only intended to allow
removal of cases where the official can allege a federal defense justifying his commission of the charged act. But this "bright line" standard may foreclose removal of harassment claims. Federal officials
may contend that the writ of habeas corpus is an inadequate remedy,
and ask Congress to amend section 1442(a)(1) to allow removal of
cases upon an allegation of harassment. However, such an amendment would cause more problems than it would solve.
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court has ruled that malicious prosecutions alleging that the official committed illegal acts
22
while off duty are not within the ambit of section 1442(a)(1).
Thus, states intent on harassment could simply wait until the official
leaves work before issuing him a speeding ticket. At a minimum,
section 1442(a)(1) would have to be amended to cover all forms of
harassment.
Moreover, such an amendment would still conflict with the
It would be logical to require the official to demonstrate harassment by a preponderance
of the evidence. The official could also litigate any federal defenses he wished to present, although the facts would be interpreted in the light most favorable to the prosecution. However,
the official could still seek removal based upon his federal defenses if his harassment claim and
federal defenses were insufficient for discharge on the writ. See infra note 221.
221. It is unclear whether an unsuccessful petition for writ of habeas corpus estops
removal based on the same federal defenses. Since the district court can only grant the writ
where the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the state support discharge, it would be
unfair for the federal official to have to give up the additional protections of a full-blown trial
on the federal defenses in order to raise a harassment claim on habeas corpus. See Clifton v.
Cox, 549 F. 2d 722, 731 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977) (Merrill, J., dissenting) (noting that a denial of
the writ should not preclude removal).
It would also be unwise to force the federal official to forego raising his federal defenses
on a writ petition in order to preserve his right to remove the case. The writ is an extraordinary remedy designed to discharge the official where state interference with federal law is
clear. We therefore should not discourage officials from raising all meritorious federal claims
in their writ petition. Although this allows the official two "bites at the apple," in practice the
official is unlikely to take the time and trouble to file a habeas corpus petition in routine
criminal prosecutions because of the higher standard of proof required for discharge on the
writ. Any such frivolous petitions can be disposed of quickly. The extra procedural step is a
small price to pay to preserve federal law.
The district court should still be able to make an independent determination as to whether
the defenses presented as grounds for removal are "colorable" without regard to the prior writ
proceedings. This step would also prevent frivolous claims.
222. See Maryland v. Soper (No. 2), 270 U.S. 36 (1926).
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standard set forth in Soper (No. 1) for officials contesting the facts
alleged in the indictment. Although Soper (No. 1) appears to allow
removal where the official claims he was harassed, that standard is
rigorous. The official must negate any inference that he committed
an act unprotected by federal law.22 Negating the inference of criminality requires the officer to prove at the evidentiary hearing that he
did not commit a crime. This burden is heavy, and would transform
the evidentiary hearing into a trial on the merits. Although the
Court in Soper (No. 2) suggested that Congress could amend the
removal statute to allow removal upon an allegation of harassment,
the Court contemplated that Congress would require the official to
bear the burden of proof at the evidentiary hearing.2 2' This burden
of proof probably would be equivalent to the habeas corpus
standard.
It is only a small step from the Court's contemplated amendment to the habeas corpus remedy-the only difference is the substitution of a judge for a jury. The change would save time and money
by substituting one habeas hearing for one evidentiary hearing plus a
trial.212 5 This substitution does not adversely affect the federal official
because a judge adequately protects him from harassment. 226 The
223. See supra note 118.
224. [W]e can only say that if prosecutions of this kind come to be used to obstruct seriously the enforcement of Federal laws, it will be for Congress in its
discretion to amend [the statute]
to mean that any prosecution of a Federal
officer for any state offense which can be shown by evidence to have had its
motive in a wish to hinder him in the enforcement of Federal law may be removed for trial . . . . [B]ut what we wish to be understood as deciding is that
the present language of [the statute] cannot be broadened by fair construction to
give it such a meaning.
Soper (No. 2), 270 U.S. at 43-44 (emphasis added). The Court implied that the official bears
the burden of producing evidence of improper motive. The burden borne by the official seeking
habeas corpus based upon a claim of harassment is unclear, but appears to be a preponderance
of the evidence. See supra notes 217-21.
225. The change would not make sense for cases involving only federal defenses because
the evidentiary hearing for such cases would be very short; the court need only verify that the
facts suggest a feasible federal defense. Removal makes sense under such circumstances. Furthermore, for cases not involving harassment claims, the facts are construed in favor of the
prosecution in determining whether the writ should issue. See supra note 215. Requiring officials to meet that higher standard to prevail on a federal defense would be unfair. However,
that standard is appropriate where the official seeks pre-trial release in the absence of a federal
defense or harassment claim.
226. Indeed, certain harassment claims must be heard by the court. A claim of malicious
prosecution requires consideration of the underlying facts of the case. But a claim of selective
prosecution is divorced from the merits, frequently relying upon statistics concerning enforcement of the state statute. The few cases which have considered the issue agree that a defense
based upon selective prosecution must be tried to the court because the defendant's guilt or
innocence is irrelevant. See United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973). Thus, the

1989]

REMOVAL OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS

official alleging harassment gains little from a jury trial. Except in
rural areas, the composition of the state and federal jury pools will
not be radically different; the venire will still be drawn from the
"hostile" state. A federal judge will certainly be unbiased; a federal
jury might not be. The goal is to transfer harassment claims into
federal court; the identity of the trier of fact is secondary. Furthermore, there will be no practical difference in handling routine traffic
cases, as the availability of a jury is a function of state law. Most
states do not allow jury trials on infractions."
Although the "preponderance of the evidence" standard for harassment claims may appear to be too strict, a lower standard will not
work. Allowing removal of harassment claims where the official
makes out a "colorable" showing of harassment would work too well
because the harassment allegation could be made so easily. The "colorable" standard is certainly the lowest burden imposed upon a moving party. For example, the official in Mesa," 8 might "colorably"
allege that his having run into a state police car, along with his status as a federal official, prompted the issuance of the traffic ticket. 29
The district courts would have to allow removal whenever harassment was alleged.
Moreover, the evidentiary hearing would not be the swift and
efficient exercise suggested by 28 U.S.C. § 1446, and it would not
screen out most harassment claims. The hearing would not focus
solely upon the harassment allegations, but turn into a mini-trial on
the merits. The official would argue successfully that a complete
presentation of his case on the merits is necessary because his showing of innocence will eliminate any proper motivation for the prosecution. Thus, the official could use the harassment allegation to
"bootstrap" his case on the merits into the evidentiary hearing before
the district court.
District courts would allow many federal officials to proceed to
trial on the merits on the theory that the jury would weed out unmeritorious claims. This is particularly true where the district court,
after hearing the official's presentation on the merits, is sympathetic
to the official's defense even while believing that the prosecution was
only issue is whether a judge should hear claims of malicious prosecution.
227. See, e.g., Aurora v. Erwin, 706 F.2d 295 (10th Cir. 1983).
228. 813 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1993 (1988), af'd, 57
U.S.L.W. 4199 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1989) (No. 87-2106).
229. Indeed, the Deputy Solicitor General for the United States appeared to advance
that argument in his presentation to the Supreme Court. See Transcript of Argument at 19-22,
Mesa, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4203.
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brought in good faith.2"' Finally, allowing removal of harassment
claims could well provide the official with two bites at the procedural
apple. An unsuccessful attempt at removal might not collaterally estop pre-trial or post-trial petitions for habeas corpus."'
The different procedure and burden of proof required in habeas
corpus proceedings resolves these problems. Although it still would
be possible to bootstrap the merits into the hearing on the petition,
the burden would shift to the official to make at least a prima facie
case of harassment at the hearing. 2 " Officials should have to meet
this higher burden when seeking to invade state sovereignty before
trial. Officials will be reluctant to take the time and effort to file a
writ petition unless they are serious. Conversely, legitimate claimants
will elect habeas corpus because they will be released immediately
after prevailing upon their petition; an official seeking removal must
first prevail at an evidentiary hearing, and then prevail again at
trial.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The legislative history of section 1442(a) indicates that a federal
defense is always required for removal of civil and criminal cases.
Section 1442(a) is a product of the Supremacy Clause and is coextensive with it. It is based on the supremacy of federal law-not the
supremacy of federal officials. Congress clearly separated the private
and official character of federal officials as required by article III,
section 2, and ensured that only those cases involving federal law
could be removed.
The Supreme Court traditionally assumed that a federal defense was required for removal. The Court ran into trouble only
after it confused the federal defense requirement with the
subordinate issue of how such defenses are put into issue. Subsequent courts compounded the error by failing to return to the intent
of Congress.
The Court's decision in Mesa is a glass half full-it restores the
230. Furthermore, there is a legitimate concern that federal judges are more likely to
favor federal officials over state law enforcement officials where the only result of such favoritism is a jury trial on the merits. This is not as great a concern in a habeas corpus proceeding
because the burden is higher and federal judges will be more careful when they must decide
whether to find formally that a state harassed a federal official.
231. It would seem fair to disallow a petition for the writ after an unsuccessful attempt
to remove a claim of harassment, at least to the extent of preventing a pretrial writ petition.
However, the official could still raise the harassment claim after trial by way of habeas corpus.
Requiring pretrial use of the writ would presumably foreclose such post-trial attacks.
232. See supra notes 217-21.
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federal defense requirement, but does not address the harassment issue. That issue can only be resolved by recourse to another remedy,
the writ of habeas corpus. Requiring federal officials to plead a federal defense for removal pursuant to section 1442(a)(1) does not preclude those officials from presenting harassment claims through a petition for habeas corpus.
This scheme attempts to balance the supremacy of federal law
with the right of states to enforce their own laws. The removal and
habeas corpus procedures cut with a scalpel, not a meat ax. They
excise only those cases implicating the Supremacy Clause; they do
not create traffic courts for federal employees. This more than an
elegant solution-it is the solution originally intended by Congress.

